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Abstract
This paper solves the problem of optimal dynamic consumption, investment, and healthcare
spending with isoelastic utility, when natural mortality grows exponentially to reflect Gompertz’
law and investment opportunities are constant. Healthcare slows the natural growth of mortality,
indirectly increasing utility from consumption through longer lifetimes. Optimal consumption
and healthcare imply an endogenous mortality law that is asymptotically exponential in the old-
age limit, with lower growth rate than natural mortality. Healthcare spending steadily increases
with age, both in absolute terms and relative to total spending. The optimal stochastic control
problem reduces to a nonlinear ordinary differential equation with a unique solution, which has
an explicit expression in the old-age limit. The main results are obtained through a novel version
of Perron’s method.
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1 Introduction
The steady rise in both incomes and life expectancy over the past century alludes to tantalizing links
between healthcare, wealth, and mortality, which are the subject of heated debate. Understanding
the relative roles of healthcare, wealth, and medical progress in explaining longevity gains is as
important as it is difficult (see Cutler et al. (2006) for a survey). Yet, with few exceptions, models
of optimal consumption and investment have largely shied away from mortality and healthcare,
leaving a wide gap between idealized theoretical settings and realistic empirical studies.
Healthcare is different from consumption in typical goods and services: it often causes immediate
pain, and is justified only by its expected effect in reversing or delaying the onset of disease and,
ultimately, death. Healthcare does not directly generate utility, but, by reducing mortality risk, it
extends the lifetime over which consumption yields utility.
Mortality (the probability that someone alive today dies next year) displays an approximate
exponential growth with age, an observation that has remained remarkably stable since its discovery
by Gompertz (1825), even as mortality has steadily declined at all age groups (Figure 1). A central
question is to which extent such decline can be ascribed to the availability and the optimal use
of healthcare, and a satisfactory answer hinges on the predictions of a model in which healthcare
choices and their resulting mortality are endogenous. This is the goal of this paper.
Our model focuses on a representative household that makes consumption, investment, and
healthcare spending decisions to maximize welfare. Consumption generates utility, healthcare re-
duces the growth of mortality below its natural, constant rate of Gompertz’ law, while investment
helps increasing wealth. Optimality is reached when their marginal values are the same.
A careful representation of the impact of death is a critical issue in models with endogenous
mortality: the ostensibly natural approach of expected lifetime utility leads to potential preference
for death over life and violates the invariance of preferences to affine transformations. To avoid this
pitfall, we assume that a death leaves the surviving household with a fraction of its previous wealth,
but the same mortality rate. This representation is consistent with the interpretation of wealth as
present value of current assets and future cash flows, and of the surviving household as a spouse in
roughly the same age group. It also preserves affine invariance and unconditional preference of life
over death.
Equally important is the impact of healthcare on mortality growth – the efficacy function. An
unwise specification, in which sufficiently high spending can arrest and reverse aging, can lead
to the implausible (and counterfactual) conclusion that early healthcare interventions can bring
mortality to zero, leaving a household immortal albeit less wealthy. We exclude such dubious
outcomes through two assumptions: first, the efficacy depends on healthcare spending relative to
wealth, thereby emphasizing the opportunity costs (such as foregone income) of healthcare and
healthy behaviors. Second, we posit that the same amount of healthcare is more effective when
health is worse, i.e., when mortality is higher.
This paper contributes to the literature both mathematically and economically. On the tech-
nical side, the model leads to an optimal control problem which features, in addition to the usual
consumption and investment, an arrival rate of jumps (deaths) that is partially controlled (by
healthcare) through a state variable (mortality). As such a control problem with jumps, it normally
corresponds to a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) integro-differential equation. Yet, exploiting a
scaling property of the value function, we are able to reduce the HJB equation to a nonlinear ordi-
nary differential equation. Although such an equation does not admit explicit solutions, we prove
that it has a single global solution through an unconventional version of Perron’s method.
Perron’s method generally refers to the construction of a viscosity solution by interposition
between a supersolution and a subsolution, which are typically more tractable (cf. Janecˇek and
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Figure 1: Mortality rates (vertical axis, in logarithmic scale) at adults ages for the birth cohorts of
years 1900 and 1940 (from top to bottom) in the United States (both males and females). Source:
Berkeley Human Mortality Database.
Sˆırbu (2012); Bayraktar and Zhang (2015)). By contrast, we apply Perron’s method not to a
single pair of super- and subsolutions, but to a collection thereof (Definition A.1). In addition
to identifying the value function as the unique solution to the reduced nonlinear HJB equation
(Theorem 3.1), this approach also delivers powerful estimates on the value function (Theorem 3.2),
which in turn yield that Gompertz’ law holds asymptotically in the old-age limit. Such additional
insights entail some challenges, such as verifying the subsolution property (Propositions A.2 and
A.3): as the equation involved is of the first order, the regularizing property of a second-order term
is not available to establish strict concavity, in contrast to standard viscosity applications.
Proving that the solution to the differential equation is indeed the value function (verification)
also requires new tools. Standard results do not apply, as they do not support controllable jump
rates, and, in extant results that support them (Cohen and Elliott, 2015, chapters 20 and 21), jump
rates depend on a control variable in a compact set, while in the present problem they depend on
a state variable, and the control has unbounded support. The technical challenges of such an
extension are overcome in Theorems B.1 and B.2, which establish a verification result that exploits
the properties of the law of the candidate optimal process.1
On the economic side, the effect of (exogenous) mortality on household decisions has long been
recognized. Yaari (1965) solves the problem of consumption and investment in a complete market
and finds that annuitization is optimal in the absence of a bequest motive. Vice versa, Richard
(1975) proves that buying life insurance is optimal as a hedge against loss of future earnings. In the
optimal consumption framework, Rosen (1988) investigates the welfare changes from gains in life
1A related potential approach to dealing with controlled jumps is stochastic Perron’s method (a verification type
result without smoothness required), as recently employed in Bayraktar and Li (2017).
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expectancy, observing the potential preference for death implied by some utility functions, while
Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) estimate the reservation price of reduced mortality risk, which hints
at the demand for healthcare. Overall, this literature investigates the marginal value of extending
life, yet without incorporating this possibility endogenously.
Endogenous mortality dates back to Grossman (1972), who introduces the concept of health
capital, assuming that its depreciation rate increases with age, and that death occurs when health
drops below a given threshold. The limits of this approach are that death is a deterministic,
perfectly foreseen event, and that health has constant returns to scale, so with bounded health
depreciation a wealthy individual could choose to live forever. Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) overcome
the latter issue assuming decreasing returns to scale, while Ehrlich (2000) makes death uncertain
by replacing health capital with “self-protection” expenditures that reduce mortality. Yogo (2016)
and Hugonnier et al. (2013) combine these approaches, modeling mortality as a function of health
capital that depreciates over time, and specifying the accumulation of health capital as a concave
function of health-expenditures relative to health capital. By contrast, Hall and Jones (2007)
emphasize the dual role of health in determining mortality and additively increasing utility from
consumption.
As this literature has evolved toward richer and more realistic models, Gompertz’ law of ex-
ponential mortality growth, however, has remained a conspicuous absence. This paper makes this
feature a central element: taking the mortality rate as sole state variable in addition to wealth,
determined jointly by Gompertz’ law and healthcare choices, we investigate the mutual response
between healthcare spending and mortality growth, and the lower mortality rates that result.
Several important implications are brought by our analysis. First, it identifies the marginal
efficacy of optimal health spending as inversely proportional to the elasticity of consumption with
respect to mortality. Because in the model such elasticity increases with mortality, and healthcare
spending has diminishing returns (decreasing marginal efficacy), it follows that health spending
relative to wealth increases with age and mortality, converging to a maximum finite rate in the
old-age limit. Second, health spending is nearly negligible in youth, but it rises rapidly with age,
outpacing the growth in consumption and taking a larger share of total spending. At very old
ages the trend reverses, as health spending rate stabilizes while consumption continues to rise
with mortality. The latter effect, however, becomes visible only at ages that are not reached by
most individuals. Third, the model generates an endogenous mortality curve in which its natural
growth is reduced by healthcare. Importantly, endogenous mortality is also close to exponential,
and asymptotically exponential in the old-age limit, thereby confirming the empirical observation
that Gompertz’ law has survived two centuries of medical progress. The reduction in mortality
growth depends on the efficacy of healthcare as well as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS), but not on other quantities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 first discusses in detail the assumptions
on preferences, mortality, and healthcare, then provides rigorous definitions of the model and its
probabilistic structure. Section 3 presents the main results in order of complexity, first in a baseline
model with neither aging nor healthcare, then adding aging, and finally in the complete setting
with both aging and healthcare. Section 4 incorporates risky assets into the main model, while
Section 5 calibrates the main model and discusses the implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The main model aims to understand optimal consumption and healthcare spending in relation to
mortality, with a focus on a household seeking to maximize total welfare. Section 4 extends the
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analysis to include investment in risky assets.
2.1 Preferences and Lifetimes
A natural starting point are the familiar time-additive preferences, in which expected welfare has
the representation
E
[∫ τ
0
e−δtU(Xtct)dt
]
, (2.1)
where τ denotes the lifetime, U : R+ → R is a utility function (i.e., increasing and concave), the
parameter δ ≥ 0 captures time-preference, and ct represents the rate of consumption per unit of
time, as a fraction of current wealth Xt, interpreted as the household’s net worth, which includes
the present value of future income, not specified separately.
The limit of this approach is that it tacitly reduces death to a change in preferences, assuming
that utility equals zero in the afterlife [τ,∞), and implying that death is preferable to negative
utility, as recognized by Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen (1988), Bommier and Rochet
(2006), Hall and Jones (2007), Bommier (2010).
Yet, a more appealing approach than costless afterlife utility is to note that households have
concrete bequest motives which center on the welfare of similar individuals. For example, upon
his death a man may leave behind a wife in a similar age group, hence with a similar mortality
rate. Such a household makes consumption and healthcare spending choices that account for the
welfare of both spouses over their lifetimes. Larger households face even more complex choices,
which involve the lives of several people.
Striking a balance between realism and tractability, suppose that a household experiences a
sequence of deaths at times (τn)n∈N0 with 0 := τ0 < τ1 < · · · < τn ↑ ∞ a.s. and that after each
death the surviving household members inherit a fraction ζ ∈ [0, 1] of wealth, while retaining the
same mortality. This assumption is clearly a simplification, as in reality households include only a
few members, but this flaw is mitigated by the time-preference parameter δ, whereby the first few
lifetimes account for most of the expected utility.
With this assumption, denoting by Xt the household wealth at time t if no deaths have occurred,
the actual household wealth after the n-th death is ζnXt, and total welfare becomes
E
[ ∞∑
n=0
∫ τn+1
τn
e−δtU(ζnXtct)dt
]
. (2.2)
Furthermore, the discussion henceforth focuses on the isoelastic class
U(x) =
x1−γ
1− γ 0 < γ 6= 1 (2.3)
which, in the absence of healthcare and mortality, generates consumption policies proportional to
wealth. Such a property is attractive because empirical consumption-wealth ratios do not display
any significant secular trend.
In contrast to the lifetime-horizon approach described earlier, this model does not equate death
to a change in preferences, but rather to a loss for the surviving household, while leaving preferences
unchanged. The parameter ζ controls the severity of the loss: ζ = 1 implies immortality (common
in the literature as uncommon in reality), as the arrivals of τn are inconsequential; at the other
extreme, with ζ = 0 death implies a total loss, after which only zero spending is possible, leading
to a constant utility rate of U(0).
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In general, ζ ∈ [0, 1] crudely summarizes the combined economic effects of death, which include
inheritance and estate taxes, loss of pensions and annuities, foregone future income, and a myriad
of other actual or opportunity costs. (A loss of future cash flow is equivalent to a loss in wealth,
assuming that the cash flow is replicable.) Although the model does not include explicitly life-
insurance and annuity contracts, the parameter ζ can also be thought of as a measure of protection
of the household wealth against mortality losses, with full protection for ζ = 1 and no protection
for ζ = 0.
The model does not distinguish between the relative impact of household components with
different ages, as the focus of this paper is not on household structure but rather on the tradeoff
between consumption and healthcare, which is now introduced.
2.2 Healthcare and Mortality
The household is homogeneous, in that all members share the same mortality Mt starting at the
initial level M0 := m0. In the absence of healthcare, mortality grows exponentially, consistently
with the classical Gompertz (1825) law
dMt = βMtdt. (2.4)
Healthcare spending reduces mortality growth according to an efficacy function g : R+ → R+ of
ht, the spending rate in healthcare as a fraction of household wealth:
dMt = (β − g(ht))Mtdt. (2.5)
The efficacy function g is assumed strictly increasing and concave, which reflects the diminishing
returns from increased health expenditure. In addition, g(0) = 0, which identifies β as the natural
rate at which mortality grows in the absence of healthcare expenditures. Finally g is defined only
on the positive real line, consistent with the interpretation of health investment as irreversible.2
The assumption that healthcare expenses affect mortality growth relative to wealth rather than
in absolute terms emphasizes the lost income and earning opportunities resulting from healthcare
usage.3 For example, for households whose wealth is dominated by the value of future income, the
lost income from healthcare usage is approximately proportional to wealth. In addition, means-
tested subsidies and income taxes on health-insurance premiums effectively make the same medical
procedures cheaper for poorer households, and the assumption of proportionality approximates this
dependence with a linear relation. Likewise, Chetty et al. (2016) recently find that life expectancy
is significantly correlated with health behaviors but not with access to medical care.4 In reality the
determinants of healthcare spending on mortality are complex (Cutler et al., 2006), and the relative
importance of proportional and absolute components is largely an empirical question. The present
simplification offers a plausible and parsimonious approximation that focuses on proportional costs.
A related important reason to consider proportional costs is to avoid the unrealistic implication
that wealth buys immortality. Indeed, if ht in (2.5) were to represent an absolute amount of health
expenditures, wealthy individuals could effectively reduce mortality to zero through early health
expenses while maintaining non-zero consumption. In reality, life expectancy in the top 1% income
percentile is about five years higher than for median incomes (Chetty et al., 2016, Figure 2).
2See for example Grossman (1972), Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), Hall and Jones (2007).
3For example, Smith (1999, 2007) reports ill health as a leading cause of early retirement.
4In their words, geographical differences in life expectancy for individuals in the lowest income quartile were
significantly correlated with health behaviors such as smoking [...], but were not significantly correlated with access to
medical care, physical environmental factors, income inequality, or labor market conditions.
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2.3 Savings
In the basic version of the model, the household leaves savings in a safe asset which earns a constant
rate r, with no other financial or insurance contracts available. In particular, the household does
not have access to life-insurance contracts that pay out in the event of death. This assumption is
consistent with the interpretation of wealth as inclusive of future income, which in practice can be
hedged only in rather limited amounts.
With these assumptions, at each time t the household spends at rates ct in consumption and
ht in healthcare, while earning a constant interest rate r on wealth. If Nt denotes the number of
deaths up to time t, regulated by the mortality dynamics in (2.5), household wealth Ξt = Xtζ
Nt
incorporating death losses evolves as:
dΞt
Ξt
= (r − ct − ht)dt− (1− ζ)dNt. (2.6)
Note that the only source of randomness is the arrival of deaths, without which the model reverts
to a deterministic consumption-investment problem, in which the optimal policy is to consume at
a rate proportional to wealth.
After the description and motivation of the main model provided here, the next section proceeds
with the mathematical details required for the precise statement of the main result.
2.4 Definitions and Notation
The rigorous formulation of the model starts with the probability space (Ω,F ,P), which supports
a sequence {Zn}n∈N of independent, identically distributed random variables with an exponential
law P(Zn > z) = e−z for all z ≥ 0 and n ∈ N. (These random times are interpreted as mortality-
adjusted times of death, as defined below.)
Denote by L1,+loc the collection of all nonnegative locally integrable functions f : R+ → R+, and
note that L1,+loc is metrizable, thus a Borel space. Define also
L :=
{
{fn}n∈N0
∣∣∣ f0 ∈ L1,+loc , fn = f(Z1, ..., Zn) for some Borel f : Rn+ → L1,+loc } ,
which represents the family of sequences of consumption-healthcare policies, with the policy after
the n-th death depending possibly on the previous n times, in addition to calendar time.
Consider a nondecreasing concave function g : R+ → R+ with g(0) = 0. For any (t,m) ∈ R2+
and h ∈ L1,+loc , let M t,m,h be the deterministic process defined by
dM t,m,hs = M
t,m,h
s [β − g(h(s))] ds, M t,m,ht = m, (2.7)
where β ≥ 0 is a fixed constant. Next, the arrival times of deaths are defined in terms of the random
variables {Zn}n∈N. For any m ≥ 0 and {hn} ∈ L, construct recursively a sequence {τn}n∈N0 of
random times as follows: first, set τ0 := 0 and m0 := m; then, for each n ≥ 0, define
τn+1 := inf
{
t ≥ τn
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
τn
M τn,mn,hns ds ≥ Zn+1
}
, mn+1 := M
τn,mn,hn
τn+1 . (2.8)
Now introduce the counting process {Nt}t≥0:
Nt := n for t ∈ [τn, τn+1), (2.9)
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and observe from the construction of {τn}n∈N0 that
P (Nt = n | Z1, ..., Zn) = P (t ∈ [τn, τn+1) | Z1, ..., Zn) = exp
(
−
∫ t
τn
M τn,mn,hns ds
)
1{t≥τn}, (2.10)
which means that the mortality rate of τn+1 at time t is precisely M
τn,mn,hn
t , as required.
Consider now the collection of processes:
A :=
{
ct =
∞∑
n=0
cn(t)1{τn≤t<τn+1}, ht =
∞∑
n=0
hn(t)1{τn≤t<τn+1}
∣∣∣∣∣ {cn}, {hn} ∈ L
}
. (2.11)
The construction of A is understood as follows: first, use {hn} ∈ L to construct {τn} as in (2.8);
then, use {cn}, {hn} ∈ L to define the processes ct and ht. Then, the process M t,m,h is defined as
in (2.7) for any h as in (2.11).
2.5 Problem Formulation
With initial wealth x ≥ 0 and initial mortality rate m ≥ 0 at time t ≥ 0, an household at each time
s ≥ t chooses the rates of spending in consumption (cs ≥ 0) and healthcare (hs ≥ 0). With savings
earning the safe rate r, household wealth Xt,x,c,hs before mortality losses evolves as
dXt,x,c,hs = X
t,x,c,h
s [r − (cs + hs)]ds, Xt,x,c,ht = x. (2.12)
The consumption and healthcare policies (c, h) ∈ A describe planned expenditures depending on
calendar time and past and current events, as follows. At time 0, the household chooses determin-
istic policies c0(t) and h0(t), and mortality M
0,m,h0 evolves accordingly as in (2.7). Upon the first
death at time τ1, the surviving household carries on with wealth ζX
0,x,c0,h0
τ1 and mortality M
0,m,h0
τ1 ,
switching to the deterministic policies c1(t) and h1(t). In general, if n deaths have occurred by
time t, the spending policies are cn(t) and hn(t).
Healthcare makes mortality partially endogenous, and its effect is summarized by the efficacy
function g, with which the houehold reduces the growth of mortality M0,m,h by selecting appropriate
{hn} ∈ L. In the absence of healthcare (i.e. g ≡ 0), M0,mt = meβt follows Gompertz’ law with
parameter β. The household’s objective at time 0 is to maximize expected utility from intertemporal
consumption
V (x,m) := sup
(c,h)∈A
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
, (2.13)
where the utility function U is of the isoelastic form in (2.3).
3 Main Results
The optimization problem considered in this paper departs from the classical consumption-investment
problem in two aspects: aging, whereby natural mortality follows Gompertz’ law, and healthcare,
which slows down mortality growth.
To understand the separate effects of each aspect, henceforth we present the main results in
order of complexity: First (Section 3.1), with neither aging nor healthcare – a minor variation of
the classical setting. Second (Section 3.2), with aging but without healthcare – a partially new
setting that provides a reference for the general model with both aging and healthcare (Section
3.3).
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3.1 Neither Aging nor Healthcare (β = 0 and g ≡ 0)
When the mortality rate is constant (β = 0), and healthcare is unavailable (g ≡ 0), the household
is essentially forever young. The arrival times of death {τn}n∈N are simply
τ0 = 0, τn+1 = inf{t ≥ τn | (t− τn) ·m ≥ Zn+1} ∀n ≥ 0,
where m ≥ 0 is the constant mortality rate. The counting process N defined in (2.9) is a Poisson
process with intensity m ≥ 0, and the collection of controls A in (2.11) reduces to
C :=
{
ct =
∞∑
n=0
cn(t)1{τn≤t<τn+1}
∣∣∣∣∣ {cn} ∈ L
}
. (3.1)
The value function in (2.13) is then
V (x,m) = sup
c∈C
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NtX0,x,ct
)
dt
]
. (3.2)
The next proposition describes the optimal policy in this basic setting:
Proposition 3.1. Let m ≥ 0 satisfy
δ + (1− ζ1−γ)m− (1− γ)r > 0. (3.3)
Then, for all x ≥ 0, V (x,m) = x1−γ1−γ c0(m)−γ , where
c0(m) :=
δ + (1− ζ1−γ)m
γ
+
(
1− 1
γ
)
r. (3.4)
Furthermore, cˆt := c0(m), for all t ≥ 0, is an optimal control of (3.2).
Proof. See Section A.1.
First, note that the parametric restriction in (3.3) is a well-posedness condition, which requires
that the time-preference rate is large enough to prevent consumption from being deferred indefi-
nitely. In fact, this restriction is equivalent to a positive consumption rate (3.4).
The main message of this proposition is that, in the absence of both aging and healthcare, the
optimal consumption rate is a constant proportion of wealth, resulting from a weighted sum of the
interest rate r and of the discount rate δ+(1−ζ1−γ)m, which captures the effects of time-preference
δ and of mortality m, weighted for its impact via ζ. In particular, for a total loss (ζ = 0), mortality
adds one-to-one to time-preference δ, and therefore it is equivalent to a higher δ, as in Yaari (1965).
Importantly, higher mortality implies a higher consumption rate for EIS 1/γ > 1, while the
opposite holds for 1/γ < 1. This dependence is explained in terms of the usual income and
substitution effects in response of negative wealth shocks. On one hand, higher mortality rate
spurs the household to consume before wealth is reduced by deaths (substitution effect). On the
other hand, mortality shocks mean less future consumption, which in turn encourages savings to
alleviate the consumption shock (income effect). Either of these countervailing effects prevails
above or below γ = 1. At this threshold, which corresponds to logarithmic utility, the two effects
perfecly offset each other, and the consumption rate reduces to the time preference δ, regardless of
mortality m, its impact ζ, and the safe rate r.
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3.2 Aging without Healthcare (g ≡ 0)
The next conceptual step is to add aging to the optimization problem, assuming that mortality
grows according to Gompertz’ law (β > 0), with no healthcare available (g ≡ 0). Thus, for an
initial mortality m ≥ 0, Mt = meβt for all t ≥ 0. The times of death {τn}n∈N then become
τ0 = 0, τn+1 = inf
{
t ≥ τn
∣∣∣∣ (eβt − eβτn)mβ ≥ Zn+1
}
∀n ≥ 0, (3.5)
while the set of controls A in (2.11) again reduces to C in (3.1), and the value function in (2.13) to
the form (3.2).
The next proposition describes the effect of aging on the optimal consumption-savings problem:
Proposition 3.2. Assume either one of the two conditions: (i) γ, ζ ∈ (0, 1) and δ + (γ − 1)r > 0;
(ii) γ, ζ > 1. Then, for any (x,m) ∈ R2+, V (x,m) = x
1−γ
1−γ u0(m)
−γ , where
u0(m) :=
[
1
β
∫ ∞
0
e
− (1−ζ1−γ )my
βγ (y + 1)
−
(
1+
δ+(γ−1)r
βγ
)
dy
]−1
> 0 (3.6)
is a strictly increasing function on (0,∞) satisfying
(a) u0(0) = c0(0) =
δ+(γ−1)r
γ > 0, limm→∞ (u0(m)− (c0(m) + β)) = 0, and
c0(m) < u0(m) < c0(m) + β for all m ∈ (0,∞). (3.7)
(b) u′0(0+) =∞, u′0(∞) = 1−ζ
1−γ
γ .
Furthermore, cˆt := u0(me
βt), for all t ≥ 0, is an optimal control of (3.2).
Proof. See Section A.2.
Although this setting is known in the actuarial literature (see for example Huang et al. (2012)),
the above result presents a few novel aspects, starting from the more complicated parametric
restrictions for well-posedness, which require that either γ, ζ ≤ 1 or γ, ζ > 1. In fact, the growing
mortality rate generates a further motive for indefinite deferral of consumption, and a resulting ill-
posed problem. Indeed, if γ > 1 but ζ < 1, with a growing mortality rate the household anticipates
so much future misery that it would attempt to reduce current consumption to zero. Indeed, only
a hypothetically positive mortality shock (ζ > 1) would lead to a well-posed problem. Such a case
ζ > 1, which would correspond to a life-insurance policy above the value of future income, is not
realistic and not pursued further: it is only discussed here to point out the source of ill-posedness
for γ > 1 with aging. As a result, the only economically relevant setting with aging corresponds to
a EIS 1/γ > 1.
The optimal consumption rate in (3.6) explicitly depends on mortality, though it does not
admit a closed-form expression. Yet, part (a) in the Proposition makes clear comparisons to
the consumption rate derived before in the case of constant mortality. In particular, for γ < 1
aging implies always a higher consumption rate, but not higher by more than the growth of aging
itself, and this upper bound is asymptotically reached in the old age limit, as mortality increases
indefinitely. In other words, the mortality growth rate β is the maximal increase in the consumption-
wealth ratio resulting from aging, compared to another household with the same mortality but
without aging. Of course, the increase in consumption rates results from the dominant substitution
effect, which responds to higher mortality with earlier consumption.
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Figure 2: Consumption-wealth ratios (vertical, in percent) against instantaneous mortality rate
(horizontal, in percent), with zero, constant, and exponentially growing mortality (solid, from
bottom to top). The dashed line represents the asymptotic linear consumption rate with high,
exponentially-growing mortality, which is also an upper bound at any mortality rate. Parameters
as in Section 4.
Finally, part (b) in the Proposition establishes that the consumption rate with respect to mor-
tality increases very steeply near immortality (m = 0), while becoming asymptotically linear in the
old age limit (m =∞), and reaching the same slope 1−ζ1−γγ as in the case without aging.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the attributes of the settings discussed so far: the flat bottom line
identifies the constant consumption rate for a household with zero mortality. The line intersecting at
m = 0 describes the consumption of a “forever young” household, for which mortality remains fixed
at m over time. The curve above this line, which also intersects at m = 0, plots the consumption
rate of an aging household, which is higher in view of the substitution effect. The top dashed
line, parallel to the constant mortality line, describes the asymptotic consumption rate of the aging
household for large m, which is also an upper bound.
Importantly, these simplified settings provide a range in which the consumption rate of the full
model should lie. As healthcare curbs mortality growth, implied consumption rate should lie below
the solution with aging but without healthcare, in anticipation of slower mortality growth. At the
same time, consumption should be higher than with a constant mortality, at least if healthcare
cannot reverse aging, as it does not in reality.
3.3 Aging with Healthcare
The full model incorporates both aging, with mortality increasing naturally with Gompertz’ law
(β > 0), and healthcare (g ≥ 0), which can slow down its growth.
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The first theorem considers the case of a general efficacy function g that satisfies the well-
posedness condition (3.9) below, which stipulates that even arbitrarily high amounts of healthcare
cannot arrest or reverse mortality growth, in addition to the following regularity conditions:
Assumption 3.1. Let g : R+ → R+ be twice-differentiable with g(0) = 0, g′(h) > 0 and g′′(h) < 0
for h > 0, and satisfy the Inada condition:
g′(0+) =∞ and g′(∞) = 0. (3.8)
The restrictions on the other parameter values ensure well-posedness by excluding indefinite
deferral of consumption.
Theorem 3.1. Let Assumption 3.1 hold, and let 0 < γ < 1 and c¯ := δγ +
(
1− 1γ
)
r > 0. If
g
(
I
(
1− γ
γ
))
< β with I := (g′)−1, (3.9)
then the value function in (2.13) satisfies V (x,m) = x
1−γ
1−γ u
∗(m)−γ where u∗ : R+ → R+ is the
unique nonnegative, strictly increasing solution to the equation
Lu(m) := u2(m)− c0(m)u(m) +mu′(m)
(
sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
u(m)
mu′(m)
h
}
− β
)
= 0. (3.10)
Furthermore, u∗ is strictly concave, and (cˆ, hˆ) defined by
cˆt := u
∗(Mt) and hˆt := I
(
1− γ
γ
u∗(Mt)
Mt · (u∗)′(Mt)
)
, for all t ≥ 0, (3.11)
optimizes (2.13).
Proof. This result is a consequence of Proposition A.5 and Corollary A.1 below.
This result identifies the optimal consumption policy as the solution of (3.10), a first-order,
nonlinear ODE, in which the effect of healthcare is captured by the last nonlinear term. Such a
solution does not have a closed-form expression even in relatively simple settings, such as the one
discussed next in Corollary 3.1, but it is nonetheless straightforward to calculate numerically, and
so are its quantitative implications.
A delicate point is that the solution to equation (3.10) is uniquely identified without any ad-
ditional boundary conditions, because the equation has only one increasing solution defined for all
m ∈ R+, while all others explode for finite m or start decreasing for m large enough. Note that
natural boundary condition u(0) = c0(0) holds for any local solution in [0, ε), and therefore does
not identify the one defined for all m ∈ R+.
Also, the above result establishes the optimality condition for healthcare expenditure in (3.11),
whereby the marginal efficacy of optimal healthcare is inversely proportional to mu′(m)/u(m), the
elasticity of consumption with respect to mortality, where the constant of proportionality depends
on preferences.
The next results provides a deeper insight on the impact of healthcare on the growth rate of
mortality:
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Theorem 3.2. Let Assumption 3.1 and condition (3.9) hold, and let 0 < γ < 1, δγ +
(
1− 1γ
)
r > 0.
Define
βg := β − sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
h
}
∈ (0, β). (3.12)
As (3.6) defines u0(m), define u
g
0(m) analogously with βg in place of β. Then, for any m > 0,
ug0(m) ≤ u∗(m) ≤ min{u0(m), c0(m) + βg} (3.13)
and
lim
m→∞(c0(m)− u
∗(m)) = βg. (3.14)
Proof. See Section A.3.
The message of this result is that even if the exact effect of healthcare on consumption is
complicated, it does admit simple upper and lower bounds (Figure 3). The lower bound is the one
obtained from ug0(m), the consumption rate in a model in which healthcare is not available, but
mortality grows at the lower rate βg < β. Indeed, the household would gladly give up access to
healthcare in exchange for such a lower rate of mortality growth.
Upper bounds are consumption rates under the same mortality growth rate β but with no access
to healthcare (i.e. u0(m)), and for a forever young household, augmented by the adjusted growth
rate βg (i.e. c0(m) + βg). The former estimate is more accurate at younger ages, while the latter
at older ages. In all cases, the minimum consumption rate, i.e. the lower bound ug0(m), yields the
sharpest estimate.
The next result specializes the analysis to a concrete model, assuming an efficacy function of
isoelastic type, thereby enabling comparative statics and parameter estimation.
Corollary 3.1. Let 0 < γ < 1, c¯ := δγ +
(
1− 1γ
)
r > 0, and g : R+ → R+ of the form
g(z) := a
zq
q
,
for some a > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1). If a
1
1−q
q
(
1−γ
γ
) −q
1−q
< β, then V (x,m) = x
1−γ
1−γ u
∗(m)−γfor all (x,m) ∈
R2+, where u∗ : R+ → R+ is the unique nonnegative, strictly increasing solution to the equation
u2(m)− c0(m)u(m)− βmu′(m) + 1− q
q
a
1
1−q
(
1− γ
γ
u(m)
) −q
1−q (
mu′(m)
) 1
1−q = 0, (3.15)
Furthermore, (cˆ, hˆ) defined by
cˆt := u
∗(Mt) and hˆt := a
1
1−q
(
1− γ
γ
u∗(Mt)
Mt · (u∗)′(Mt)
) −1
1−q
, for all t ≥ 0,
is an optimal control of (2.13).
With this result at hand, we investigate in Section 5 the model’s implications for the optimal
policies and their resulting endogenous mortality.
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Figure 3: Consumption-wealth ratios (vertical axis, in percent) against instantaneous mortality
rates (horizontal). Solid curves correspond to aging households with natural mortality growth β,
with (center) and without (top) healthcare, and with adjusted mortality growth βg (bottom). The
dashed line represents the asymptotic linear consumption ratio, which is also an upper bound.
4 Risky Assets
The main model in the paper assumes that households’ savings are confined to a safe investment.
This section discusses extending the model to include risky assets. The main question is to what
extent healthcare and endogenous mortality are sensitive to risky investments and – conversely –
whether portfolio allocation is sensitive to the mortality rate. Theorem 4.1 below argues that the
presence of risky assets with constant investment opportunities is equivalent to an increase in the
safe rate, and that the resulting optimal portfolio is independent of mortality (cf. equations (4.10)
and (4.11) below). Thus, the main results in the paper remain valid with the addition of risky
assets, up to reinterpreting the safe rate parameter as an equivalent safe rate that accounts for
additional investment opportunities.
Specifically, consider a risky asset S satisfying the dynamics
dSt = St(µ+ r)dt+ StσdWt, t ≥ 0, (4.1)
where µ ∈ R and σ > 0 are constants and W is a standard Brownian motion independent of
{Zn}n∈N. The independence assumption is appropriate for most individuals, as death is unlikely
to affect, or result from, price changes of publicly traded securities. Denoting by pit the fraction of
wealth that the household invests in the risky asset at time t, when no deaths have occurred the
wealth process is
dXt
Xt
= [(1− pit)r − ct − ht]dt+ pitdSt
St
= [r + µpit − ct − ht]dt+ σpitdWt, t ≥ 0. (4.2)
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To properly define the value function and derive the associated HJB equation, our probability
space (Ω,F ,P) in Section 2.4 needs to be enlarged to account for the additional Brownian motion
W . Specifically, let (Ω1,F1,P1) be the probability space supporting the i.i.d. exponential random
variables {Zn}n∈N, as specified in Section 2.4. Let (Ω2,F2,P2) be another probability space that
supports the Brownian motion W . Then, we take (Ω,F ,P) to be the product probability space of
(Ω1,F1,P1) and (Ω2,F2,P2), endowed with the filtration {Ft}t≥0 generated by {Zn}n∈N and W .
We denote by E1, E2, and E the expectations taken under P1, P2, and P, respectively.
Between two consecutive death times, ct and ht are no longer deterministic as in (2.11), because
they may depend on the evolution of S in (4.1) (or, the Brownian motion W ). More precisely, let
L1loc(Ω2) denote the collection of processes f : R+ × Ω2 → R such that E2[
∫ t
0 f(s)ds] < ∞ for all
t ≥ 0. Also consider L1,+loc (Ω2), the subspace of L1loc(Ω2) containing nonnegative processes. Define
L′ :=
{{fn}n≥0 ∣∣ f0 ∈ L1loc(Ω2), fn = f(Z1, ..., Zn) for some Borel f : Rn+ → L1loc(Ω2)} .
We also consider L′+, defined as L′ with L1loc(Ω2) replaced by L
1,+
loc (Ω2). Now, for any {hn} ∈ L′+,
the death times in (2.8) can be formulated as follows: for each ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω,
τn+1(ω) := inf
{
t ≥ τn(ω)
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
τn
M τn,mn,hns (ω2)ds ≥ Zn+1(ω1)
}
, mn+1 := M
τn,mn,hn
τn+1 (ω).
Thus, (2.10) can be rewritten as, for any fixed ω2 ∈ Ω2,
P1 (t ∈ [τn(·, ω2), τn+1(·, ω2)) | Z1, ..., Zn) (ω1)
= exp
(
−
∫ t
τn(ω1,ω2)
M τn,mn,hns (ω2)ds
)
1{t≥τn}(ω1, ω2), ∀n ≥ 0. (4.3)
Similarly to (2.11), the collection A′ of admissible controls contains all processes (ct, ht, pit) where
ct =
∞∑
n=0
cn(t)1{τn≤t<τn+1}, ht =
∞∑
n=0
hn(t)1{τn≤t<τn+1}, pit =
∞∑
n=0
pin(t)1{τn≤t<τn+1}, (4.4)
with {cn}, {hn} ∈ L′+ and {pin} ∈ L′.
Now, define the value function as
V (x,m) := sup
c,h,pi
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtU(ζNtXtct)dt
]
= sup
c,h,pi
∞∑
n=0
E
[∫ τn+1
τn
e−δtU(ζnXtct)dt
]
. (4.5)
4.1 Derivation of the HJB Equation and Optimal Policies
In the following, we will first derive heuristically the HJB equation for V (x,m) and the candidate
optimal policies. These heuristic guesses turn out to be truly optimal, as verified in Theorem 4.1.
By the definition of V (x,m) in (4.5),
V (x,m) = sup
c,h,pi
E
[∫ τ1
0
e−δtU(ctXt)dt+ e−δτ1
∫ ∞
τ1
e−δ(t−τ1)U(ζNtctXt)dt
]
= sup
c,h,pi
E
[∫ τ1
0
e−δtU(ctXt)dt+ e−δτ1V (ζXτ1 ,Mτ1)
]
,
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where in the second line we assume heuristically that a dynamic programming principle for (4.5)
holds. By Fubini’s theorem and P1[τ1(·, ω2) > t] = e−
∫ t
0 M
0,m,h0
s (ω2)ds from (4.3), the above equation
yields
V (x,m) = sup
c,h,pi
E2
[∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 Msdse−δtU(ctXt)dt+
∫ ∞
0
Mte
− ∫ t0 Msdse−δtV (ζXt,Mt)dt
]
= sup
c,h,pi
E2
[∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (δ+Ms)ds[U(ctXt) +MtV (ζXt,Mt)]dt
]
.
This shows that the value function can be viewed alternatively as an infinite-horizon problem
with running payoff U(ctXt) + MtV (ζXt,Mt) and discount rate δ + Mt. Suppose that a dynamic
programming principle holds for this alternative formulation, i.e.
V (x,m) = sup
c,h,pi
E2
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 (δ+Ms)ds[U(ctXt) +MtV (ζXt,Mt)]dt
+ e−
∫ T
0 (δ+Ms)dsV (XT ,MT )
]
, ∀T > 0. (4.6)
Then, in view of
d
(
e−
∫ t
0 (δ+Ms)dsV (Xt,Mt)
)
= e−
∫ t
0 (δ+Ms)ds
[
−(Mt + δ)V (Xt,Mt) + Vx(Xt,Mt)dXt
+ Vm(Xt,Mt)dMt +
1
2
Vxx(Xt,Mt)(dXt)
2
]
,
(4.6) implies that for all T > 0,
0 = sup
c,h,pi
E2
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 (δ+Ms)ds[U(ctXt) +MtV (ζXt,Mt) +K(Xt,Mt, ct, ht, pit)]dt
]
,
where
K(x,m, c, h, pi) :=− (δ +m)V (x,m) + [r + µpi − c− h]xVx(x,m)
+ (β − g(h))mVm(x,m) + 1
2
σ2pi2x2Vxx(x,m),
thereby leading to the HJB equation
0 = sup
c≥0
{U(cx)− cxVx(x,m)}+mV (ζx,m)− (δ +m)V (x,m) + rxVx(x,m)
+ sup
pi∈R
{
µpixVx(x,m) +
1
2
σ2pi2x2Vxx(x,m)
}
(4.7)
+ βmVm(x,m) + sup
h≥0
{−g(h)mVm(x,m)− hxVx(x,m)}.
Assuming heuristically that Vxx < 0 and Vm < 0, the above equation suggests the following
candidate optimal policies (cˆ, pˆi, hˆ) from the first-order conditions:
cˆ =
Vx(x,m)
−1/γ
x
, pˆi = − µ
σ2x
Vx(x,m)
Vxx(x,m)
, hˆ = (g′)−1
(
− xVx(x,m)
mVm(x,m)
)
, (4.8)
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which in turn imply that (4.7) can be simplified as
0 =
γ
1− γ (Vx(x,m))
γ−1
γ +mV (ζx,m)− (δ +m)V (x,m) + rxVx(x,m) + βmVm(x,m)
− 1
2
(µ
σ
)2 V 2x (x,m)
Vxx(x,m)
−mVm(x,m) sup
h≥0
{
g(h) +
hxVx(x,m)
mVm(x,m)
}
. (4.9)
Using the ansatz V (x,m) = x
1−γ
1−γ u(m)
−γ , the above equation reduces to
0 = u2(m)− c¯0u(m)− βmu′(m) +mu′(m) sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
u(m)
mu′(m)
h
}
, (4.10)
where
c¯0(m) :=
δ + (1− ζ1−γ)m
γ
+
(
1− 1
γ
)(
r +
1
2γ
(µ
σ
)2)
. (4.11)
The next result shows that the heuristic derivation above does lead us to truly optimal strategies.
Theorem 4.1. Including the risky asset S as in (4.1), Proposition 3.1, Proposition 3.2, and The-
orem 3.1 still hold true, with the interest rate r replaced by r + 12γ
(µ
σ
)2
. In particular, the optimal
consumption and health spending are as specified therein, with c0 replaced by c¯0 in (4.11), while the
optimal portfolio is
pˆit ≡ µ
γσ2
, t ≥ 0.
Proof. Comparing (3.4) and (4.11), note that c¯0 differs from c0, and thus equation (4.10) differs
from (3.15), only in the interest rate: r is now raised to r+ 12σ
(µ
σ
)2
. It follows that we can re-state
all the results in Section 3, with the raised interest rate, by using appropriate verification results
Theorem B.2 and Proposition B.2, extensions of Theorem B.1 and Proposition B.1 to account for
the risky asset S. The resulting optimal ratios in consumption and health spending are the same
as in Section 3, while the optimal ratio in investment is given by (4.8):
pˆit = − µ
σ2Xt
Vx(Xt,Mt)
Vxx(Xt,Mt)
= − µ
σ2Xt
X−γt u(Mt)−γ
(−γ)X−γ−1t u(Mt)−γ
=
µ
γσ2
.
5 Calibration and Implications
This section discusses the implications of the isoelastic model in Corollary 3.1 for optimal policies,
with the model’s parameters calibrated to the values r = 1%, δ = 1%, β = 7.7%, γ = 0.67, ζ = 50%,
a = 0.1, q = 0.46, and m0 = 0.019%. A safe rate of r = 1% approximates the long-term average real
rate on Treasury bills reported by (Beeler and Campbell, 2012), and our time preference δ = 1%
is also consistent with their estimates, while γ = 0.67 corresponds to the estimates obtained by
Harrison et al. (2007) in field experiments. The conventional value of ζ = 50% implies that the
household loses half of its wealth with each death, and describes a household in which future income
(including pensions and annuities) represents a high proportion of the net worth.
The values of the mortality natural growth β is estimated from mortality data for the US cohort
born in 1900, assuming no healthcare available. Holding these estimates constant, the healthcare
parameters a and q appearing in the efficacy function are calibrated by matching the endogenous
mortality curve with mortality data for the US cohort born in 1940.
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Figure 4: Left: Consumption- and healthcare-wealth ratios (vertical) at adult ages (horizontal).
Right: Healthcare, as a fraction of total spending (vertical) at adult ages (horizontal).
5.1 Healthcare Spending
Empirical studies thoroughly confirm the familiar observation that health spending increases with
age, raising the natural question of whether the model’s predictions satisfy this basic property.
The left panel in Figure 4 offers an affirmative answer. At age 40, annual healthcare spending is
just above 0.2% of wealth, but it rises quickly to almost 1% at age 80. Such increase is broadly
consistent with the results of Hartman et al. (2008), who report at age 85 and older health spending
between 5.7 and 6.9 times as large as at general working-ages.
In the model, healthcare is unattractive in the young age, as mortality is unlikely, and its poten-
tial losses lead to low optimal healthcare spending. As mortality grows exponentially, healthcare
spending increases accordingly, at a rate that is not far from mortality growth.
The right panel in Figure 4 compares health spending to total spending, including consumption.
Although the increases in mortality implies higher spending rate in both categories, the effect is
very pronounced for healthcare, as its weight increases from less than 10% at age 40 to almost 20%
at age 80.
5.2 Mortality
A central question for the model at hand is to what extent it can account for the secular decrease
in mortality rates. Figure 5 attempts to evaluate the model performance under two simplifying
assumptions. First, suppose that the cohort with birth in 1900 essentially had no access to health-
care, therefore that its mortality simply grows exponentially with Gompertz’ law at the natural
rate β. Second, suppose that the 1940 cohort had full access to healthcare, whence its mortality
rate follows the endogenous growth implied by the model.
Both assumptions are clearly crude approximations, as healthcare did exist in 1900, though
it was certainly less advanced and available than forty years later. Also, being forty-year old in
1940, the 1900 cohort clearly had some access to healthcare. Yet, as mortality rates in the United
States are available from 1933, data on the 1900 cohort begins with 33-year olds. Similarly, at the
time of writing mortality rates for 75-year-olds are not available for younger cohorts than 1940.
Data availability aside, much of the rise in employer-sponsored insurance in the United States
developed in the wake of wage controls enacted during World War II, which makes the 1940 cohort
a reasonable choice for the our purposes.
Keeping in mind these limitations of the model and the data, Figure 5 shows that the calibrated
parameters are able to largely explain the decline in mortality between the two cohorts as the
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Figure 5: Empirical (dots) and model-implied (lines) mortality rates at adult ages for the birth
cohorts of 1900 and 1940
result of health spending. In particular, it attests the ability of the model to reproduce declines
in mortality rates that are close to the ones observed historically, and that are consistent with the
plausible levels of health spending described above.
6 Conclusion
The role of healthcare in reducing mortality rather than increasing current utility calls for a different
treatment from other forms of consumption. At the same time, the exponential growth of mortality
is a leading driver of health spending. This paper combines these features in a model of optimal
choice of consumption and health spending, in which savings accrue a constant interest rate.
The model captures a few stylized facts on mortality and health spending. Healthcare leads to
an endogenously determined mortality curve that is close to exponential, albeit with a lower growth
rate, consistently with the observed secular decline in mortality. Healthcare spending continues to
increase at adult ages, outpacing consumption growth, and therefore also its share of total spending
increases.
A Proofs of Main Results
In this section, we prove the main results in Section 3 by verification arguments, relying on Theorem
B.1 and Proposition B.1. Given f : R+ → R, consider its Legendre transform f˜(y) := supx≥0{f(x)−
xy} for y ∈ R+. A heuristic derivation as in Section 4.1 shows that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
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associated with V (x,m) in (2.13) is
U˜(wx(x,m)) +mw(ζx,m)− (δ +m)w(x,m)
+ rxwx(x,m) + βmwm(x,m) + sup
h≥0
{−mwm(x,m)g(h)− hxwx(x,m)} = 0. (A.1)
This is simply (4.9) without the second-order term, contributed by the added risky asset in Section 4.
A.1 Neither Aging nor Healthcare (β = 0 and g ≡ 0)
Recall the setup in Section 3.1. Since V (x,m) is nondecreasing in x by definition, the supremum
in the last term of (A.1) vanishes, leading to the equation
U˜(wx(x,m)) +mw(ζx,m)− (δ +m)w(x,m) + rxwx(x,m) = 0. (A.2)
If V is of the form V (x,m) = x
1−γ
1−γ v(m). Then, the above equation reduces to
v(m)
1− 1
γ − c0(m)v(m) = 0,
where c0(m) is defined as in (3.4). By setting v(m) = u(m)
−γ , we obtain from the above equation
u2(m)− c0(m)u(m) = 0, (A.3)
whence u(m) = c0(m). We then prove Proposition 3.1 by verification.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Set w(x,m) := x
1−γ
1−γ c0(m)
−γ . Note that (3.3) implies c0(m) > 0 for all
γ > 0, γ 6= 1.
Case I: 0 < γ < 1. By Theorem B.1, it suffices to verify (B.2) and (B.3) under current context.
For any x ≥ 0, c ∈ C, and n ∈ N, since 0 < γ < 1, we have
0 ≤ E
[
e−(δ+m)(t−τn)w
(
ζnX0,x,ct ,m
) ∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zn]
≤ e−(δ+m)(t−τn) (ζ
nX0,x,cτn )
1−γ
1− γ e
(1−γ)r(t−τn)c0(m)−γ → 0 a.s. as t→∞,
where the convergence follows from (3.3). This already verifies (B.2). On the other hand, since τn
is the sum of n independent, identically distributed exponential random variables with mean 1/m,
0 ≤ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,cτn ,m
)] ≤ ζ(1−γ)n x1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γE
[
e−δτne(1−γ)rτn
]
= ζ(1−γ)n
x1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γ
∫ ∞
0
e−(δ+(γ−1)r)tmne−mt
tn−1
(n− 1)!dt
=
(
mζ(1−γ)
)n
(n− 1)!
x1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γ
∫ ∞
0
e−(δ+m+(γ−1)r)ttn−1dt
=
(
mζ(1−γ)
δ +m+ (γ − 1)r
)n
x1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γ ,
(A.4)
where the third equality requires δ + m + (γ − 1)r > 0, which is true under (3.3). Finally, noting
that (3.3) implies mζ
(1−γ)
δ+m+(γ−1)r ∈ (0, 1), we conclude that E
[
e−δτmn w
(
ζnX0,x,cτmn ,m
)] → 0 as n → ∞,
which verifies (B.3).
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Case II: γ > 1. By Proposition B.1, it suffices to establish (B.17)-(B.19) and show that
cˆt ≡ c0(m) satisfies (B.2) and (B.3). For any ε > 0, since g ≡ 0, the sequence {τ εn}n≥0 constructed
in Appendix B coincides with {τn}n≥0. The counting process N ε in (B.15) is therefore the same
as N in (2.9). It follows that (B.19) trivially holds under current context. Given x ≥ 0, c ∈ C, and
ε > 0, consider
(cε)t :=
ctX
0,x,c
t
X0,x,ct + εe
rt
∀t ≥ 0. (A.5)
By construction, X0,x+ε,cεt = X
0,x,cε + εert for all t ≥ 0. This, together with γ > 1, implies that for
any n ∈ N,
0 ≥ E
[
e−(δ+m)(t−τn)w
(
ζnX0,x+ε,cεt ,m
) ∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zn] ≥ e−(δ+m)(t−τn) (ζnε)1−γe(1−γ)rt
1− γ c0(m)
−γ .
Since the right hand side converges to 0 a.s. as t → ∞, the above inequality in particular implies
that (B.17) holds. On the other hand, by a calculation similar to (A.4),
0 ≥ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x+ε,cετn ,m
)] ≥ ζ(1−γ)n ε1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γE
[
e−δτne(1−γ)rτn
]
=
(
mζ(1−γ)
δ +m+ (γ − 1)r
)n
ε1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γ .
Since (3.3) again guarantees that mζ
(1−γ)
δ+m+(γ−1)r ∈ (0, 1), we conclude that E[e−δτnw(ζnX0,x,cτn ,m)]→ 0
as n→∞, which verifies (B.18). Now, with cˆt ≡ c0(m), for any n ∈ N,
0 ≥ e−(δ+m)(t−τn)w(X0,x,cˆt ,m) =
(X0,x,cˆτn )
1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γe−[δ+m+(γ−1)(r−c0(m))](t−τn), if t > τn.
Observing that (3.3) implies
δ +m+ (γ − 1)(r − c0(m)) = c0(m) +mζ1−γ > 0, (A.6)
we conclude that e−(δ+m)(t−τn)w(X0,x,cˆt ,m) → 0 a.s. as t → ∞. This shows that cˆ satisfies (B.2).
Thanks to (A.6), a calculation similar to (A.4) yields
0 ≥ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,cˆτn ,m
)]
= ζ(1−γ)n
x1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γE
[
e−δτne(1−γ)(r−c0(m))τn
]
=
(
mζ1−γ
c0(m) +mζ1−γ
)n
x1−γ
1− γ c0(m)
−γ → 0 as n→∞,
which shows that cˆ satisfies (B.3).
A.2 Aging without Healthcare (g ≡ 0)
Recall the setup in Section 3.2. The Hamilton-Jacobi equation (A.1) associated with the value
function V (x,m) now becomes
U˜(wx(x,m)) +mw(ζx,m)− (δ +m)w(x,m) + rxwx(x,m) + βmwm(x,m) = 0. (A.7)
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If V is of the form V (x,m) = x
1−γ
1−γ v(m), the above equation turns into
v(m)
1− 1
γ − c0(m)v(m) + βm
γ
v′(m) = 0,
where c0(m) is given by (3.4). Setting v(m) = u(m)
−γ , we obtain from the above equation
u2(m)− c0(m)u(m)− βmu′(m) = 0, (A.8)
which admits the general solution
u(m) = βe
− (1−ζ1−γ )m
βγ
[
Cβm
δ+(γ−1)r
βγ +
∫ ∞
1
e
− (1−ζ1−γ )mu
βγ u
−
(
1+
δ+(γ−1)r
βγ
)
du
]−1
,
where C ∈ R is a constant to be determined. Proposition 3.2 states that taking C = 0, which turns
u(m) into u0(m) in (3.6), leads to our value function V (x,m). In the following, we separate the
proof of Proposition 3.2 into two parts.
Lemma A.1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.2, u0 defined in (3.6) is a strictly increasing
function on (0,∞) satisfying (a) and (b) in Proposition 3.2.
Proof. The definition of u0 in (3.6) directly implies that u0 is strictly increasing, u0(0) =
δ+(γ−1)r
γ ,
and u′0(0+) =∞. Since u0 solves (A.8), for any m ∈ (0,∞),
u0(m)− c0(m) = βmu
′
0(m)
u0(m)
> 0,
where the inequality follows from u0 being positive and strictly increasing. On the other hand,
using y + 1 < ey for y > 0, (3.6) yields
u0(m) < β
[∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−
(
(1− ζ1−γ)m
βγ
+ 1 +
δ + (γ − 1)r
βγ
)
y
}
dy
]−1
= β
[
δ + (1− ζ1−γ)m+ (γ − 1)r
βγ
+ 1
]
= c0(m) + β.
Finally, Taylor’s expansion of u0(m) at infinity shows
u0(m) = c0(m) + β +O(1/m).
This implies u0(m)− (c0(m) + β)→ 0 as m→∞, and
lim
m→∞u
′
0(m) = limm→∞
u0(m)
m
=
1− ζ1−γ
γ
.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Properties (a) and (b) are established in Lemma A.1. Here, we prove the
rest of the claims in Proposition 3.2. Set w(x,m) := x
1−γ
1−γ u0(m)
−γ . By Lemma A.1, it remains to
show that V (x,m) = w(x,m) and cˆt := u0(me
βt), t ≥ 0, is an optimal control of (3.2). First, we
observe that cˆ is an element of C. Indeed, for any compact subset K of R+, thanks to u0 ≤ c0 + β
in Lemma A.1, ∫
K
cˆtdt ≤
∫
K
δ + (1− ζ1−γ)meβt + (γ − 1)r
γ
+ β dt <∞. (A.9)
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Now we deal with two cases separately.
Case I: condition (i) holds. By Theorem B.1, it suffices to verify (B.2) and (B.3) under
current context. For any (x,m) ∈ R2+, c ∈ C, and n ∈ N, by using γ ∈ (0, 1) and X0,x,ct ≤
X0,x,cτn exp (r(t− τn)) on the set {t ≥ τn},
0 ≤ E
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
τn
(δ +meβs)ds
)
w
(
ζnX0,x,ct ,me
βt
) ∣∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zn]
≤ e−(δ+m)(t−τn) (ζ
nX0,x,cτn )
1−γ
1− γ e
(1−γ)r(t−τn)u0(meβt)−γ → 0 a.s. as t→∞,
where the convergence follows from δ + (γ − 1)r > 0 and u0 being a nondecreasing function by
definition. This in particular implies (B.2). On the other hand,
0 ≤ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,cτn ,me
βτn
)]
≤ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γE
[
e−δτne(1−γ)rτnu0(meβτn)−γ
]
≤ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γ u0(m)
−γE
[
e−(δ+(γ−1)r)τn
]
≤ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γ u0(m)
−γ → 0 as n→∞,
where the fourth inequality follows from δ+(γ−1)r > 0 and the convergence is due to γ, ζ ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, (B.3) is satisfied.
Case II: condition (ii) holds. By Proposition B.1, it suffices to establish (B.17)-(B.19) and show
that cˆt := u0(me
βt) satisfies (B.2) and (B.3). For any ε > 0, since g ≡ 0, the sequence {τ εn}n≥0
constructed in Appendix B coincides with {τn}n≥0. The counting process N ε in (B.15) is therefore
the same as N in (2.9). Thus, (B.19) trivially holds under current context. Given (x,m) ∈ R2+,
c ∈ C, and ε > 0, consider the consumption policy cε as in (A.5), and the associated property
X0,x+ε,cεt = X
0,x,c
t + εe
rt for all t ≥ 0. We then deduce from γ > 1 and u0 being an nondecreasing
function that for any n ∈ N,
0 ≥ E
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
τn
(δ +meβs)ds
)
w
(
ζnX0,x+ε,cεt ,me
βt
) ∣∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zn]
≥ e−(δ+m)(t−τn) (ζ
nε)1−γe(1−γ)rt
1− γ u0(m)
−γ → 0 a.s. as t→∞,
which in particular implies (B.17). Since γ > 1 ensures δ + (γ − 1)r > 0, we have
0 ≥ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x+ε,cετn ,me
βτn
)]
≥ ζ(1−γ)n ε
1−γ
1− γ u0(m)
−γE[e−(δ+(γ−1)r)τn ]
≥ ζ(1−γ)n ε
1−γ
1− γ u0(m)
−γ → 0 as n→∞,
where the convergence follows from γ, ζ > 1. This verifies (B.18). Now, for any n ∈ N, applying
cˆt := u0(me
βt), t ≥ 0, yields
0 ≥ E
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
τn
(δ +meβs)ds
)
w
(
X0,x,cˆt ,me
βt
) ∣∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zn]
≥ e−[δ+(γ−1)r](t−τn) exp
(
−
∫ t
τn
[
meβs − (γ − 1)u0(meβs)
]
ds
)
(X0,x,cˆτn )
1−γ
1− γ u0(m)
−γ (A.10)
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on the set {t ≥ τn}. By direct calculation, u0(m) defined in (3.6) can be expressed as
u0(m) = β
e
−m(1−ζ1−γ )
βγ
(
m(1−ζ1−γ)
βγ
)− δ+(γ−1)r
βγ
Γ
(
− δ+(γ−1)rβγ , m(1−ζ
1−γ)
βγ
) ,
where Γ(s, z) :=
∫∞
z t
s−1e−tdt is the upper incomplete gamma function. Recalling the property
Γ(s,z)
e−zzs−1 → 1 as z →∞, it follows that
lim
m→∞
m
γu0(m)
=
1
1− ζ1−γ > 1, (A.11)
whence meβs > γu0(me
βs) for s large enough. This, together with u0 being a positive nonincreasing
function, shows that
∫ t
τn
[
meβs − (γ − 1)u0(meβs)
]
ds→∞ a.s. as t→∞. We then conclude from
(A.10) that cˆ satisfies (B.2). It remains to show that cˆ satisfies (B.3). Observe that
0 ≥ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,cˆτn ,me
βτn
)]
≥ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γ u0(m)
−γE
[
e−(δ+(γ−1)r)τn exp
(∫ τn
0
(γ − 1)u0(meβs)ds
)]
≥ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γ u0(m)
−γ
∫ ∞
0
P(τn ∈ dt) exp
(∫ t
0
(γ − 1)u0(meβs)ds
)
dt, (A.12)
where the third line above follows from e−(δ+(γ−1)r)τn ≤ 1 as γ > 1. Note that for each n ∈ N,∑n
i=1 Zi has a gamma distribution with the law P(
∑n
i=1 Zi ≤ z) = 1Γ(n)Γ(n, z), where Γ(s) :=∫∞
0 t
s−1e−tdt is the gamma function and Γ(s, z) :=
∫ z
0 t
s−1e−tdt is the lower incomplete gamma
function. We then observe from (3.5) that
P(τn ≤ t) = P
(
m
β
(eβt − 1) ≥
n∑
i=1
Zi
)
=
1
Γ(n)
Γ
(
n,
m
β
(eβt − 1)
)
∀t ≥ 0.
It follows that
P(τn ∈ dt) = d
dt
P(τn ≤ t) = 1
Γ(n)
(
m
β
)n
(eβt − 1)n−1e−mβ (eβt−1)βeβt ∀t ≥ 0. (A.13)
Also, for any
α ∈ ((1− 1/γ)(1− ζ1−γ), 1) , (A.14)
(A.11) yields mγu0(m) >
α
1−ζ1−γ for m large enough. Thus, there exists t
∗ > 0 such that
1− ζ1−γ
αγ
meβt > u0(me
βt), for t ≥ t∗. (A.15)
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By setting C(t∗) := exp
( ∫ t∗
0 (γ − 1)u0(meβs)ds
)
, we obtain from (A.12) that
0 ≥ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,cˆτn ,me
βτn
)]
≥ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γ
u0(m)
−γ
Γ(n)
(
m
β
)n [
C(t∗)
∫ t∗
0
(eβt − 1)n−1e−mβ (eβt−1)βeβtdt
+
∫ ∞
t∗
(eβt − 1)n−1e−mβ (eβt−1)βeβte(1− 1γ )(1−ζ1−γ) mαβ (eβt−1)dt
]
≥ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γ
u0(m)
−γ
Γ(n)
(
m
β
)n [
C(t∗)
∫ ∞
0
yn−1e−
m
β
y
dy +
∫ ∞
0
yn−1e−
[
1− 1
α
(1− 1
γ
)(1−ζ1−γ)
]
m
β
y
dy
]
= ζ(1−γ)n
x1−γ
1− γ u0(m)
−γ
[
C(t∗) +
(
1− 1
α
(
1− 1
γ
)(
1− ζ1−γ))−n] , (A.16)
where the second line follows form (A.13) and (A.15), the fourth line is due to the change of variable
y = eβt − 1, and the last equality holds when 1 − 1α
(
1 − 1γ
)(
1 − ζ1−γ) > 0, which is true under
(A.14). Noting that (A.14) implies 1− 1α
(
1− 1γ
)(
1− ζ1−γ) > 1− (1− ζ1−γ) = ζ1−γ , we conclude
from (A.16) that E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,cˆτn ,me
βτn
)]→ 0 as n→∞, i.e. cˆ satisfies (B.3).
A.3 Aging with Healthcare
Recall the setup in Section 3.3 where mortality increases naturally according to Gompertz’ law
(β > 0), and at the same time healthcare is available (i.e. g : R+ → R+ is not constantly 0) to
slow down the mortality growth. For the rest of this section, let Assumption 3.1 hold, and denote
by I : R+ → R+ the inverse function of g′, and note that I is strictly decreasing.
If the value function (2.13) is of the form V (x,m) = x
1−γ
1−γ v(m), then (A.1) yields
v(m)
1− 1
γ − c0(m)v(m) + βm
γ
v′(m) +
1− γ
γ
sup
h≥0
{
−v
′(m)
1− γ
(
mg(h) + h
(1− γ)v(m)
v′(m)
)}
= 0,
where c0(m) is given by (3.4). By setting v(m) = u(m)
−γ and assuming that u′(m) ≥ 0, the above
equation becomes
u2(m)− c0(m)u(m)− βmu′(m) +

mu′(m) sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1−γγ u(m)mu′(m)h
}
= 0, if 0 < γ < 1,
mu′(m) inf
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1−γγ u(m)mu′(m)h
}
= 0, if γ > 1.
(A.17)
Since g is a nondecreasing function with g(0) = 0, the infimum above equals 0. That is, when γ > 1,
the above equation reduces to (A.8), and the associated value function and optimal consumption
strategy are as described in Proposition 3.2.
Hence, we focus on the case 0 < γ < 1 in the rest of this section. The equation (A.17) is now
Lu(m) = 0 as in (3.10). In the following, we will employ Perron’s method to construct solutions to
(3.10), under the assumption that
c¯ :=
δ
γ
+
(
1− 1
γ
)
r > 0. (A.18)
Definition A.1. Let Π be the collection of (p, q), where p, q : R+ → R are continuous and satisfy
(i) c0 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ c0 + β on (0,∞).
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(ii) p and q are strictly increasing and concave.
(iii) p (resp. q) is a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) to (3.10) on (0,∞).
For any (p, q) ∈ Π, let S(p, q) denote the collection of continuous f : R+ → R such that
1. p ≤ f ≤ q on (0,∞).
2. f is strictly increasing and concave.
3. f is a viscosity supersolution to (3.10) on (0,∞).
Remark A.1. Under (A.18) and (3.9), Π 6= ∅. Indeed, c0 + β is a supersolution to (A.8), and
thus a supersolution to (3.10). Specifically, for any m > 0,
L(c0 + β)(m) ≥ (c0(m) + β)β − βm
(
1− ζ1−γ
γ
)
= βc¯+ β2 > 0. (A.19)
On the other hand, c0 is a subsolution to (3.10): for any m > 0
Lc0(m) = am
(
sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
c¯
am
h
}
− β
)
= am
[
g
(
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
c¯
am
]))
− 1− γ
γ
[
1 +
c¯
am
]
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
c¯
am
])
− β
]
< 0, (A.20)
where a := 1−ζ
1−γ
γ and the inequality follows from (3.9). Thus, Π contains at least (c0, c0 + β).
Also note that for each (p, q) ∈ Π, S(p, q) 6= ∅ because by construction q ∈ S(p, q).
We first present a basic result for strictly increasing, concave functions f which are bounded by
c0 and c0 + β. Note that the concavity of f implies f
′(∞) := limm→∞ f ′(m−) is well-defined.
Lemma A.2. Assume 0 < γ < 1 and (A.18). For any nonnegative, strictly increasing, and concave
f : R+ → R, we have f(m)mf ′(m−) ≥ 1 for all m ∈ (0,∞). If f additionally satisfies c0 ≤ f ≤ c0 + β
on (0,∞), then f ′(∞) = 1−ζ1−γγ and f(m)mf ′(m−) → 1 as m→∞.
Proof. Since f is strictly increasing with f(0) ≥ 0, the concavity of f implies f(m)m ≥ f ′(m−) > 0,
and thus f(m)mf ′(m−) ≥ 1 for all m ∈ (0,∞). Suppose f is additional bounded by c0 and c0 + β.
Since c0 is a linear function with slope
1−ζ1−γ
γ , if f
′(∞) 6= 1−ζ1−γγ , then f(m) /∈ [c0(m), c0(m) + β]
for m large enough, a contradiction. Moreover, we deduce from c0(m) ≤ f(m) ≤ c0(m) + β and
f ′(∞) = 1−ζ1−γγ > 0 that
1 +
δ + (γ − 1)r
(1− ζ1−γ)m ≤
f(m)
mf ′(∞) ≤ 1 +
δ + (γ − 1)r + βγ
(1− ζ1−γ)m , m > 0.
This implies f(m)mf ′(∞) → 1 as m→∞.
The next result shows that c0 + α is a supersolution to (3.10) on (0,∞) for α large enough.
Lemma A.3. Assume 0 < γ < 1, (A.18), and (3.9). For any α ∈ [0, β], c0 + α is a supersolution
to (3.10) on (0,∞) if and only if α ∈ [βg, β], where βg is defined in (3.12). Specifically,
α ∈ [βg, β] =⇒ L(c0 + α)(m) > 0 for all m > 0;
α ∈ [0, βg) =⇒ L(c0 + α)(m)→ −∞ as m→∞.
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Proof. For any a, b > 0, consider the function
θ(m) := L(am+ b) = (am+ b)
[(
a− 1− ζ
1−γ
γ
)
m+ (b− c¯)
]
+ am (`(m)− β) , (A.21)
where
`(m) := sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
]
h
}
= g
(
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
]))
− 1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
]
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
])
. (A.22)
By direct calculation,
`′(m) =
1− γ
γ
b
am2
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
])
, (A.23)
θ′(m) = 2a
(
a− 1− ζ
1−γ
γ
)
m+ a(b− c¯) + b
(
a− 1− ζ
1−γ
γ
)
+ a
(
`(m)− β + 1− γ
γ
b
am
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
]))
, (A.24)
θ′′(m) = 2a
(
a− 1− ζ
1−γ
γ
)
−
(
1− γ
γ
)2 b2
am3
I ′
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
])
> 0, (A.25)
where the positivity follows from I ′(y) = ddy (g
′)−1(y) = 1
g′′((g′)−1(y)) =
1
g′′(I(y)) and g
′′ < 0.
For any α ∈ [0, β], c0(m) +α = am+ b with a = 1−ζ1−γγ and b = c¯+α. Then (A.21) reduces to
θ(m) = am[α− (β − `(m))] + αb. (A.26)
Observe from (A.22) that β − `(m)→ βg as m→∞. It follows that
lim
m→∞L(c0 + α)(m) = limm→∞ θ(m) =
{
−∞, if α ∈ [0, βg);
+∞, if α ∈ (βg, β].
(A.27)
This already shows that if α ∈ [0, βg), c0 + α cannot be a supersolution to (3.10) on (0,∞).
It remains to show that if α ∈ [βg, β], c0 + α satisfies L(c0 + α)(m) > 0 for all m > 0. This is
true for α = β, as explained in Remark A.1. For any α ∈ (βg, β), using a = 1−ζ1−γγ and b = c¯+ α
under current setting and (A.22), (A.24) becomes
θ′(m) = a
[
α− β + g
(
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
]))
− 1− γ
γ
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
])]
, (A.28)
which implies θ′(m) → α − β < 0 as m ↓ 0. This, together with limm→∞ θ(m) = ∞ in (A.27)
and θ′′(·) > 0 in (A.25), shows that θ must attain a global minimum at some m∗ ∈ (0,∞). Using
θ′(m∗) = 0, we obtain from (A.28) that
α− 1− γ
γ
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am∗
])
= β − g
(
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am∗
]))
. (A.29)
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The global minimum can then be computed as
θ(m∗) = am∗[α− β + `(m)] + αb
= am∗
[
α− β + g
(
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am∗
]))
− 1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am∗
]
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am∗
])]
+ αb
= b
[
α− 1− γ
γ
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am∗
])]
= b
[
β − g
(
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am∗
]))]
> 0,
where the second equality comes from (A.22), the third and fourth equalities follow from (A.29),
and the final inequality is due to (3.9). We thus conclude that for any α ∈ (βg, β), L(c0 +α)(m) =
θ(m) ≥ θ(m∗) > 0 for all m ∈ (0,∞). Finally, for α = βg, since c0 + βg is the pointwise infimum of
the supersolutions c0 + α, α ∈ (βg, β], it must also be a supersolution, thanks to (Crandall et al.,
1992, Lemma 4.2). Observe from (A.28) that limm↑∞ θ′(m) = a[βg − βg] = 0. This, together with
θ′′ > 0 in (A.25) and c0 +βg being a supersolution, shows that θ(m) must be strictly decreasing on
(0,∞) with limm↑∞ θ(m) ≥ 0. This already implies L(c0 + βg)(m) = θ(m) > 0 for all m > 0.
Lemma A.4. Assume 0 < γ < 1, (A.18), and (3.9). For any (p, q) ∈ Π, p < c0 + βg on R+, with
βg defined in (3.12).
Proof. By contradiction, suppose “p < c0 + βg on R+” does not hold. If there exists m0 > 0 such
that p(m) = c0(m) + βg for all m ≥ m0, then the subsolution property of p is violated, thanks
to Lemma A.3. Thus, it remains to deal with the second case: there exists m0 > 0 such that
p(m) > c0(m) + βg for m > m0.
Since p′(∞) = 1−ζ1−γγ (by Lemma A.2 (i)), there must exist α0 ∈ (βg, β] such that p ≤ c0+α0 and
(c0(m) +α)− p0(m) ↓ 0 as m→∞. Consider the collection of functions {c0 +α : α ∈ (α0+βg2 , α0)}.
For each α ∈ (α0+βg2 , α0), we let θα(m) := L(c0 + α)(m), and recall the formula of θα in (A.26). It
shows that
θα(m)
m
= a[α− (β − `(m))] + α(c¯+ α)
m
→ a[α− βg] as m→∞,
where a := 1−ζ
1−γ
γ . Moreover, in view of (A.22) with b replaced by c¯ + α, the above convergence
is uniform in α ∈ (α0+βg2 , α0). That is, for any δ > 0, there exists M(δ) > 0 such that for all
m ≥ M(ε) and α ∈ (α0+βg2 , α0), | θ
α(m)
m − a[α − βg]| < δ. Taking δ := a(α0−βg)4 , we get for any
m > M(δ) and α ∈ (α0+βg2 , α0),
θα(m)
m
> a[α− βg]− δ > a
[
α0 + βg
2
− βg
]
− δ = a
[
α0 − βg
4
]
. (A.30)
Fix ε ∈ (0, a(α0−βg)4β ). We can take α ∈ (α0+βg2 , α0) large enough such that c0 + α intersects p at
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m∗ > M(δ) and a < p′(m∗) < a+ ε. It follows that
L(p)(m∗) = p(m∗)(p(m∗)− c0(m∗)) +m∗p′(m∗)
(
sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
p(m∗)
m∗p′(m∗)
h
}
− β
)
= α(c0(m
∗) + α) + sup
h≥0
{
g(h)m∗p′(m∗)− 1− γ
γ
p(m∗)h
}
− βm∗p′(m∗)
≥ α(c0(m∗) + α) + sup
h≥0
{
g(h)m∗a− 1− γ
γ
(c0(m
∗) + α)h
}
− βm∗(a+ ε)
= θα(m∗)− βm∗ε = m∗
(
θα(m∗)
m∗
− βε
)
> 0,
where the third equality follows from θα(m∗) = L(c0 + α)(m∗), and the last inequality is due to
(A.30) and the choice of ε. This implies that p cannot be a subsolution to (3.10) on (0,∞), a
contradiction.
Following Perron’s method, we introduce, for each (p, q) ∈ Π, the function
u∗p,q(m) := inf
f∈S(p,q)
f(m), m ≥ 0. (A.31)
Proposition A.1 (Supersolution Property). Assume 0 < γ < 1 and (A.18). For any (p, q) ∈ Π,
u∗p,q ∈ S(p, q).
Proof. As a pointwise infimum of concave nondecreasing functions bounded by c0 and c0 + β, u
∗
p,q
is by definition concave, nondecreasing, and bounded by c0 and c0 +β. The concavity of u
∗
p,q yields
the desired continuity. Then, by (Crandall et al., 1992, Lemma 4.2), u∗p,q, being continuous and a
pointwise infimum of viscosity supersolution, is again a viscosity supersolution. It remains to show
that u∗p,q is strictly increasing. Suppose to the contrary that u∗p,q ≡ κ > 0 in a neighborhood of
some m∗ ∈ (0,∞). The concavity of u∗p,q then implies that u∗p,q ≡ κ on [m∗,∞). It follows that
Lu∗p,q(m) = κ(κ − c0(m)) < 0 as m large enough. This contradicts the supersolution property of
u∗p,q.
Proposition A.2 (Subsolution Property). Assume 0 < γ < 1 and (A.18). Fix (p, q) ∈ Π. Suppose
u∗p,q is strictly concave at m0 ∈ (0,∞) in the following sense:
for any m1,m2 ∈ (0,∞) and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that m0 = λm1 + (1− λ)m2,
u∗p,q(m0) > λu∗p,q(m1) + (1− λ)u∗p,q(m2).
(A.32)
Then, u∗p,q is a viscosity subsolution to (3.10) at m0.
Proof. If u∗p,q is strictly concave at m0 ∈ (0,∞) as defined above, there are three possibilities:
(i) (u∗p,q)′(m0−) 6= (u∗p,q)′(m0+); (ii) (u∗p,q)′(m0−) = (u∗p,q)′(m0+), and u∗ is strictly concave on
the interval [m0 − κ,m0 + κ] for some κ > 0; (iii) (u∗p,q)′(m0−) = (u∗p,q)′(m0+), and there exists
κ1, κ2 > 0 such that u
∗
p,q is linear on [m0−κ1,m0] and strictly concave on [m0,m0 +κ2], or strictly
concave on [m0 − κ1,m0] and linear on [m0,m0 + κ2].
We assume, by contradiction, that there exists a test function ψ ∈ C1((0,∞)) such that 0 =
(u∗p,q − ψ)(m0) > (u∗p,q − ψ)(m) for all m ∈ (0,∞) \ {m0} and Lψ(m0) > 0. For the cases (i) and
(ii), we can assume without loss of generality that ψ is strictly increasing and concave on (0,∞).
Take δ > 0 small enough such that Lψ(m) > 0 for all m ∈ (m0 − δ,m0 + δ). Then, for small
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enough ε > 0, one can take 0 < δ1 ≤ δ such that for each 0 < η ≤ ε, L(ψ − η)(m) > 0 for all
m ∈ (m0 − δ1,m0 + δ1). Consider the function
uη(m) :=
{
min{u∗p,q(m), ψ(m)− η}, for m ∈ [m0 − δ1,m0 + δ1],
u∗p,q(m), for m /∈ [m0 − δ1,m0 + δ1].
(A.33)
When η is small enough, uη by construction is a concave, strictly increasing viscosity supersolution
to (3.10) on (0,∞), and u∗p,q − η ≤ uη ≤ u∗p,q. That is, uη ∈ S(p, q) as η is small enough. However,
by definition uη < u∗p,q in some small neighborhood of m0, which contradicts the definition of u∗p,q.
Now we deal with the case (iii). Set a := (u∗p,q)′(m0−) = (u∗p,q)′(m0+). In view of (3.10), to get
the desired subsolution property, it suffices to prove
(u∗p,q)
2(m0)− c0(m0)u∗p,q(m0) + am0
(
sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
u∗p,q(m0)
am0
h
}
− β
)
≤ 0. (A.34)
We assume, without loss of generality, that u∗p,q is linear on [m0 − κ1,m0] and strictly concave on
[m0,m0 + κ2]. Take {`n}n∈N in (m0,m0 + κ2] such that `n ↓ m0 and u∗p,q is differentiable at `n.
Then, the subsolution property we established above under case (ii) implies that Lu∗p,q(`n) ≤ 0 for
all n ∈ N. Observe that the map
m 7→ sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
u∗p,q(m)
m(u∗p,q)′(m)
h
}
is continuous around m0, (A.35)
thanks to g being strictly concave and nondecreasing with g′(∞) = 0. As n → ∞, Lu∗p,q(`n) ≤ 0
implies (A.34), by the continuity of u∗p,q and (A.35).
We next establish the strict concavity of u∗p,q. Recall that I denotes the inverse function of g′.
Proposition A.3 (Strict Concavity). Assume 0 < γ < 1, (A.18), and (3.9). For any (p, q) ∈ Π,
u∗p,q is strictly concave on (0,∞).
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that u∗p,q is linear, i.e. u∗p,q(m) = am + b, on some interval of
R+. Since u∗p,q ∈ S(p, q), we deduce from Lemma A.2 that a ≥ 1−ζ
1−γ
γ and b ∈ [c¯, c¯ + β]. Recall
θ(m) := L(am+ b) in (A.21).
• Case I: a = 1−ζ1−γγ and b ∈ [c¯, c¯+ βg). Then u∗p,q(m) = am+ b = c0(m) +α for m large enough,
where α := b − c¯ ∈ [0, βg). By Lemma A.3, limm↑∞ L(u∗p,q)(m) = limm↑∞ L(c0 + α)(m) = −∞.
This contradicts the supermartingale property of u∗p,q.
• Case II: a = 1−ζ1−γγ and b ∈ [c¯+ βg, c¯+ β].
– Case II-1: u∗p,q(m) = am+ b for all m ≥ 0, with b ∈ (c¯+ βg, c¯+ β].
Let us write u∗p,q(m) = c0(m) + α, with α := b− c¯ ∈ (βg, β]. For any α¯ ∈ (βg, α), Lemmas A.3
and A.4 imply that c0 + α¯ belongs to S(p, q) and is strictly less than u∗p,q, which contradicts
the definition of u∗p,q.
– Case II-2: u∗p,q(m) = am+ (c¯+ βg) for all m ≥ 0.
We deduce from (A.21) and (A.28) that limm↓0 θ(m) = b(b − c¯) > 0 and limm↓0 θ′(m) =
b− c¯− β < 0. Thus, we can take m∗ > 0 small enough such that θ(m∗) > 0 and θ′(m∗) < 0.
In view of the continuous dependence of θ(m∗) and θ′(m∗) on a, b in (A.21) and (A.24), there
exists δ > 0 small enough such that when a, b are replaced by a¯ ∈ (a, a+ δ) and b¯ ∈ (b− δ, b),
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θ(m∗) > 0 and θ′(m∗) < 0 still hold. Take suitable a¯ ∈ (a, a + δ) and b¯ ∈ (b − δ, b) such that
a¯m∗+ b¯ = u∗p,q(m∗) and a¯m+ b¯ > p(m) for m ∈ (0,m∗] (this is doable thanks to Lemma A.4).
For clarity, let θ¯ and θ¯′ denote θ and θ′ with a, b replaced by a¯, b¯. Now, we deduce from
limm↓0 θ¯(m) = b¯(b¯ − c¯) > 0 (obtained from (A.21) as above), θ¯(m∗) > 0, θ¯′(m∗) < 0, and
θ¯′′(m) > 0 for all m > 0 (by (A.25)) that θ¯(m) > 0 for all m ∈ (0,m∗). Consider the function
ψ(m) := a¯m+ b¯. By definition Lψ(m) = θ¯(m) > 0 for m ∈ (0,m∗). Thus, ψ ∧ u∗p,q belongs to
S(p, q) and is strictly less than u∗p,q for m ∈ (0,m∗). This contradicts the definition of u∗p,q.
– Case II-3: There exists m0 > 0 such that u
∗
p,q(m) = am + b for all m ≥ m0, and u∗p,q is
strictly concave at m0 in the sense of (A.32).
By Proposition A.2, u∗p,q is a viscosity subsolution to (3.10) at m0. Take ψ(m) := am+ b, m ∈
(0,∞), as a test function of u∗p,q at m0. The subsolution property of u∗p,q yields Lψ(m1) ≤ 0.
Note that ψ(m) = c0(m) + α with α := b− c¯ ∈ [βg, β]. Thus, by Lemma A.3, Lψ(m) > 0 for
all m > 0, a contradiction.
• Case III: a > 1−ζ1−γγ and b = c¯. Then there exists m0 > 0 such that u∗p,q(m) = am + b for
m ∈ [0,m0] and u∗p,q is strictly concave at m0 in the sense of (A.32). By Proposition A.2, u∗p,q is
a viscosity subsolution to (3.10) at m0. For all m ∈ (0,∞), define
η(m) :=
(
a+
b
m
)[(
a− 1− ζ
1−γ
γ
)
m+ (b− c¯)
]
+ a (`(m)− β) ,
with ` as in (A.22). Note that θ(m) = mη(m). By direct calculation and (A.23),
η′(m) = a
(
a− 1− ζ
1−γ
γ
)
− b
m2
[
(b− c¯)− 1− γ
γ
I
(
1− γ
γ
[
1 +
b
am
])]
. (A.36)
Since we currently have b = c¯, η′(m) > 0 for all m ∈ (0,∞). Now, take ψ(m) := am + b,
m ∈ (0,∞), as a test function of u∗p,q at m0. Then the subsolution property of u∗p,q implies
0 ≥ Lψ(m0) = θ(m0) = m0η(m0). We therefore have η(m) < 0 for all m ∈ (0,m0). The
supersolution property of u∗p,q, however, entails 0 ≤ Lu∗p,q(m) = θ(m) = mη(m) for all m ∈
(0,m0), a contradiction.
• Case IV: a > 1−ζ1−γγ and b ∈ (c¯, c¯+ β).
– Case IV-1: There exists m0 > 0 such that u
∗
p,q(m) = am + b for m ∈ [0,m0], and u∗p,q is
strictly concave at m0 in the sense of (A.32).
We first show that p(0) has to be strictly less than u∗p,q(0). If p(0) = u∗p,q(0), then limm↓0 p′(m) ≤
a; otherwise, p(m) > u∗p,q(m) for m > 0 small enough, which contradicts u∗p,q ∈ S(p, q). By
the concavity of p, we can take a real sequence {`n} such that `n ↓ 0 and p is differentiable
at `n. The subsolution property of p then implies Lp(`n) ≤ 0 for all n ∈ N. As n → ∞, we
get p(0)(p(0) − c¯) ≤ 0, thanks to the finiteness of limm↓0 p′(m). This shows that p(0) < c¯, a
contradiction to p ≥ c0.
By Proposition A.2, u∗p,q is a viscosity subsolution to (3.10) at m0. Take ψ(m) := am + b,
m ∈ (0,∞), as a test function of u∗p,q at m0. Then the subsolution property of u∗p,q implies 0 ≥
Lψ(m0) = θ(m0). Observe from (A.21) that limm↓0 θ(m) = b(b− c¯) > 0. If limm↓0 θ′(m) ≥ 0,
then θ′′ > 0 on (0,∞) (by (A.25)) implies that θ(m) > θ(0) > 0 for all m > 0, which
contradicts θ(m0) ≤ 0. If limm↓0 θ′(m) < 0, then we can follow the argument in Case II-2.
Take 0 < m∗ < m0 small enough such that θ(m∗) > 0 and θ′(m∗) < 0. By the continuous
dependence of θ(m∗) and θ′(m∗) on a, b, there exists δ > 0 such that when a, b are replaced
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by a¯ ∈ (a, a + δ) and b¯ ∈ (b − δ, b), θ(m∗) > 0 and θ′(m∗) < 0 still hold. Choose suitable
a¯ ∈ (a, a+δ) and b¯ ∈ (b−δ, b) such that a¯m∗+ b¯ = u∗p,q(m∗) and a¯m+ b¯ > p(m) for m ∈ (0,m∗]
(this is doable thanks to p(0) < u∗p,q(0)). For clarity, let θ¯ and θ¯′ denote θ and θ′ with a, b
replaced by a¯, b¯. Now, we deduce from limm↓0 θ¯(m) > 0, θ¯(m∗) > 0, θ¯′(m∗) < 0, and θ¯′′ > 0 on
(0,∞) that θ¯(m) > 0 for all m ∈ (0,m∗). Consider the function φ(m) := a¯m+ b¯. By definition
Lφ(m) = θ¯(m) > 0 for m ∈ (0,m∗). Thus, φ ∧ u∗p,q belongs to S(p, q) and is strictly less than
u∗p,q for m ∈ (0,m∗). This contradicts the definition of u∗p,q.
– Case IV-2: There exist m1,m2 ∈ (0,∞) such that u∗p,q(m) = am + b for m ∈ [m1,m2], and
u∗p,q is strictly concave at m1 and m2 in the sense of (A.32).
By Proposition A.2, u∗p,q is a viscosity subsolution to (3.10) at both m1 and m2. Now, take
ψ(m) := am + b, m ∈ (0,∞), as a test function of u∗p,q at m1 and m2. Then the subsolution
property of u∗p,q implies 0 ≥ Lψ(m1) = θ(m1) and 0 ≥ Lψ(m2) = θ(m2). Since θ′′ > 0 on
(0,∞) (by (A.25)), we must have θ(m3) < 0 for some m3 ∈ (m1,m2). The supersolution
property of u∗p,q, however, entails 0 ≤ Lψ(m) = θ(m) for all m ∈ (m1,m2), a contradiction.
Proposition A.4 (Regularity). Assume 0 < γ < 1, (A.18), and (3.9). For any (p, q) ∈ Π, u∗p,q is
a strictly concave classical solution to (3.10) on (0,∞).
Proof. For any (p, q) ∈ Π, Propositions A.1, A.2, and A.3 immediately imply that u∗p,q is a
strictly concave viscosity solution to (3.10) on (0,∞). It remains to show that u∗p,q is differen-
tiable everywhere on (0,∞). Assume, by contradiction, that there exists m0 ∈ (0,∞) such that
a := (u∗)′(m0+) < (u∗)′(m0−) =: b. Take {kn}n∈N and {`n}n∈N in (0,∞) such that kn ↑ m0,
`n ↓ m0, and u∗p,q is differentiable at kn and `n for all n ∈ N. By the viscosity solution property of
u∗p,q, Lu∗(kn) = Lu∗(`n) = 0, for all n ∈ N. As n→∞, we get
sup
h≥0
{
(g(h)− β)a− 1− γ
γ
u∗p,q(m0)
m0
h
}
= sup
h≥0
{
(g(h)− β)b− 1− γ
γ
u∗p,q(m0)
m0
h
}
,
which implies that a = b, a contradiction.
Proposition A.5 (Verification). Assume 0 < γ < 1, (A.18), and (3.9). If u : R+ → R+ is a
nonnegative, strictly increasing, and concave classical solution to (3.10) on (0,∞), then
V (x,m) =
x1−γ
1− γ u(m)
−γ for all (x,m) ∈ R2+.
Furthermore, (cˆ, hˆ) defined by
cˆt := u(Mt) and hˆt := I
(
1− γ
γ
u(Mt)
Mt · (u)′(Mt)
)
, for all t ≥ 0,
is an optimal control of (2.13).
Proof. Set w(x,m) := x
1−γ
1−γ u(m)
−γ . In view of Theorem B.1, it suffices to show that (B.2) and (B.3)
hold, and (cˆ, hˆ) belongs to A. Since u is nonnegative, strictly increasing, and concave, Lemma A.2
implies that hˆt ≤ I(1−γγ ) for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, there exist a, b > 0 such that u(m) < am+ b for
all m ≥ 0. It follows that for any compact subset K ⊂ R+,∫
K
cˆtdt ≤
∫
K
aMt + b dt ≤
∫
K
ameβt + b dt <∞.
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This already shows that (cˆ, hˆ) ∈ A.
Under (3.9), u being a classical solution to (3.10) implies u2(m) − u(m)c0(m) ≥ 0, and thus
u(m) ≥ c0(m) for all m ∈ (0,∞). Now, for any (x,m) ∈ R2+, (c, h) ∈ A, and n ∈ N, by using
0 < γ < 1 and X0,x,c,ht ≤ X0,x,c,hτn exp (r(t− τn)), we have
0 ≤ E
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
τn
(δ +M0,m,hs )ds
)
w
(
ζnX0,x,c,ht ,M
0,m,h
t
) ∣∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zn]
≤ e−δ(t−τn) (X
0,x,c,h
τn )
1−γ
1− γ e
(1−γ)r(t−τn)E[u(M0,m,ht )
−γ | Z1, ..., Zn]
≤ e−(δ+(γ−1)r)(t−τn) (X
0,x,c,h
τn )
1−γ
1− γ (c¯)
−γ → 0 a.s. as t→∞,
where the second line is due to M0,m,ht ≥ 0 by definition, and the third line follows from u being
strictly increasing with u(m) > u(0) ≥ c0(0) = c¯ > 0, and the convergence is a consequence of
δ + (γ − 1)r = γc¯ > 0. This in particular implies (B.2). On the other hand, for each n ∈ N,
0 ≤ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,c,hτn ,M
0,m,h
τn
)]
≤ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γE
[
e−δτne(1−γ)rτnu(M0,m,hτn )
−γ
]
≤ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γ (c¯)
−γE
[
e−(δ+(γ−1)r)τn
]
≤ ζ(1−γ)n x
1−γ
1− γ (c¯)
−γ → 0 as t→∞,
where the last inequality is due to δ+ (γ−1)r = γc¯ > 0. The shows that (B.3) is also satisfied.
Proposition A.5, together with Propositions A.4 and A.1, leads to:
Corollary A.1. Assume 0 < γ < 1, (A.18), and (3.9). Then u∗p,q is independent of the choice of
(p, q) ∈ Π, and it is the unique nonnegative, strictly increasing, and concave classical solution to
(3.10) on (0,∞).
Remark A.2. Proposition A.5 and Corollary A.1 yield Theorem 3.1.
In the following, we will simply denote by u∗ the function u∗p,q for any (p, q) ∈ Π.
Corollary A.2 (Strict Concavity of u0). Assume 0 < γ < 1 and (A.18). Then u0, defined in
(3.6), is strictly concave on (0,∞).
Proof. With g ≡ 0, the equation (3.10) reduces to (A.8), and we can repeat the same arguments
in this section (with much simpler proofs) to show that the strictly concave u∗ constructed under
Perron’s method coincides with u0.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.2
Proof of Theorem 3.2. First, observe that βg = β − g
(
I
(1−γ
γ
))
+ 1−γγ I
(1−γ
γ
)
. Then (3.9) implies
that βg > 0. Since u0 is a solution to (A.8) and u
′
0(m) ≥ 0, it is a supersolution to (3.10). This,
together with Lemma A.1, Corollary A.2, and Remark A.1, shows that (c0, u0) ∈ Π. It follows that
u∗ = u∗c0,u0 ≤ u0. Similarly, (c0, c0 +βg) ∈ Π by Lemma A.3, which implies u∗ = u∗c0,c0+βg ≤ c0 +β.
This already yields u∗ ≤ min{u0, c0 + βg}. On the other hand, thanks again to Lemma A.1 and
Corollary A.2 with β replaced by βg, u
g
0 is nonnegative, strictly increasing, concave, and bounded
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from below and above by c0 and c0 + βg respectively. Then, Lemma A.2 implies
ug0(m)
m(ug0)
′(m) ≥ 1 for
all m > 0. It follows that
β − sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
ug0(m)
m(ug0)
′(m)
h
}
≥ βg, ∀m > 0.
Since ug0 is by construction a solution to (A.8) with β replaced by βg, the above inequality gives
0 = (ug0(m))
2 − ug0(m)c0(m)− βgm(ug0)′(m)
≥ (ug0(m))2 − ug0(m)c0(m) +m(ug0)′(m)
(
sup
h≥0
{
g(h)− 1− γ
γ
ug0(m)
m(ug0)
′(m)
h
}
− β
)
= Lug0(m),
for all m > 0. This shows that (ug0, c0 + βg) ∈ Π, and thus u∗ = u∗ug0,c0+βg ≥ u
g
0.
B Verification
In this section, we provide a general verification theorem for the value function V (x,m) in (2.13).
Given (c, h) ∈ A, we introduce, for each n ∈ N, the truncated policies (c(n), h(n)) ∈ A:
c
(n)
t :=
(
n−1∑
k=0
ck(t)1{τk≤t<τk+1}
)
+ cn(t)1{t≥τn}, h
(n)
t :=
(
n−1∑
k=0
hk(t)1{τk≤t<τk+1}
)
+ hn(t)1{t≥τn}.
(B.1)
Theorem B.1. Let w ∈ C1,1(R+×R+) satisfy (A.1). Suppose for any (x,m) ∈ R2+ and (c, h) ∈ A,
lim
t→∞E
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
τn
(δ +M0,m,h
(n)
s )ds
)
·
w
(
ζnX0,x,c
(n),h(n)
t ,M
0,m,h(n)
t
) ∣∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zn] = 0 ∀n ≥ 0, (B.2)
lim
n→∞E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,c
(n),h(n)
τn ,M
0,m,h(n)
τn
)]
= 0. (B.3)
(i) w(x,m) ≥ V (x,m) on R+ × R+.
(ii) Suppose there exist two measurable functions c¯, h¯ : R2+ → R+ such that c¯(x,m) and h¯(x,m)
are maximizers of
sup
c≥0
{U(cx)− cxwx(x,m)} and sup
h≥0
{−wm(x,m)g(h)− hxwx(x,m)} ,
respectively, for all (x,m) ∈ R2+. Let X¯, M¯ , N¯ denote the solutions to
dXs = Xs[r − (c¯(Xs,Ms) + h¯(Xs,Ms))]ds X0 = x,
dMs = Ms
[
β − g(h¯(ζNsXs,Ms))
]
ds M0 = m,
Ns =
∞∑
k=0
k1{Tk≤t<Tk+1}, with T0 := 0, Tn+1 := inf
{
t ≥ Tn
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
Tn
Msds ≥ Zn+1
}
, n ≥ 1.
Define the processes (cˆ, hˆ) by
cˆt := c¯(ζ
N¯tX¯t, M¯t) and hˆt := hˆ(ζ
N¯tX¯t, M¯t), for t ≥ 0. (B.4)
If (cˆ, hˆ) ∈ A, then (cˆ, hˆ) is an optimal control of the problem (2.13), and w(x,m) = V (x,m)
on R+ × R+.
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Proof. (i) Given (c, h) ∈ A, recall that
ct =
∞∑
n=0
cn(t)1{τn≤t<τn+1} and ht =
∞∑
n=0
hn(t)1{τn≤t<τn+1}
for some {cn}, {hn} ∈ L. We claim that the following holds for all n ∈ N:
w(x,m) ≥ E
[ ∫ τn
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
+ E
[
e−δτnw
(
ζnX0,x,c,hτn ,M
0,m,h
τn
)]
. (B.5)
First, we prove this for n = 1. Since c0 and h0 are deterministic functions and w is a classical
solution to (A.1),
e−
∫ t
0 (δ+M
0,m,h0
ν )dνw(X0,x,c0,h0t ,M
0,m,h0
t ) ≤ w(x,m)
−
∫ t
0
e−
∫ s
0 (δ+M
0,m,h0
ν )dν
[
U
(
c0(s)X
0,x,c0,h0
s
)
+M0,m,h0s w
(
ζX0,x,c0,h0s ,M
0,m,h0
s
)]
ds, (B.6)
for all t ≥ 0. Letting t→∞ and in view of (B.2),
w(x,m) ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ s
0 (δ+M
0,m,h0
ν )dνU
(
c0(s)X
0,x,c0,h0
s
)
ds
+
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ s
0 (δ+M
0,m,h0
ν )dνM0,m,h0s w(ζX
0,x,c0,h0
s ,M
0,m,h0
s )ds.
(B.7)
Thanks to Fubini’s theorem and (2.10), observe that
E
[ ∫ τ1
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
1{τ1>t}e
−δtU
(
c0(t)X
0,x,c0,h0
t
)
dt
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (δ+M
0,m,h0
ν )dνU
(
c0(t)X
0,x,c0,h0
t
)
dt, (B.8)
E
[
e−δτ1w
(
ζX0,x,c,hτ1 ,M
0,m,h
τ1
)]
= E
[
e−δτ1w
(
ζX0,x,c0,h0τ1 ,M
0,m0,h0
τ1
)]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (δ+M
0,m,h0
ν )dνM0,m,h0t w
(
ζX0,x,c0,h0t ,M
0,m,h0
t
)
dt, (B.9)
whence (B.5) holds true for n = 1 in view of (B.7)-(B.9). Now, suppose (B.5) holds true for
n = k > 1. That is,
w(x,m) ≥ E
[ ∫ τk
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
+ E
[
e−δτkw
(
ζkX0,x,c,hτk ,M
0,m,h
τk
)]
. (B.10)
By writing xk = ζ
kX0,x,c,hτk and mk = M
0,m,h
τk , we get (B.6) with (0, x,m, c0, h0) replaced by
(τk, xk,mk, ck, hk). This, together with (B.2), gives
w
(
ζkX0,x,c,hτk ,M
0,m,h
τk
)
= w(xk,mk)
≥ E
[ ∫ ∞
τk
exp
(
−
∫ t
τk
(δ +M τk,mk,hkν )dν
)
U
(
ck(t)X
τk,xk,ck,hk
t
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zk] (B.11)
+ E
[∫ ∞
τk
exp
(
−
∫ t
τk
(δ +M τk,mk,hkν )dν
)
M τk,mk,hkt w
(
ζXτk,xk,ck,hkt ,M
τk,mk,hk
t
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zk] .
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Using Fubini’s theorem and (2.10) as in (B.8)-(B.9), the above inequality implies that
E
[
e−δτkw
(
ζkX0,x,c,hτk ,M
0,m,h
τk
)]
≥ E
[ ∫ τk+1
τk
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
+ E
[
e−δτk+1w
(
ζk+1X0,x,c,hτk+1 ,M
0,m,h
τk+1
)]
. (B.12)
This, together with (B.10), shows that
w(x,m) ≥ E
[ ∫ τk+1
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
+ E
[
e−δτk+1w
(
ζk+1X0,x,c,hτk+1 ,M
0,m,h
τk+1
)]
.
The claim (B.5) therefore holds by induction. Letting n → ∞ in (B.5), by the monotone conver-
gence theorem and (B.3), w(x,m) ≥ E[ ∫∞0 e−δtU(ctζNtX0,x,c,ht )dt] for all (c, h) ∈ A. Taking the
supremum over (c, h) ∈ A(m) leads to w(x,m) ≥ V (x,m).
(ii) With (c, h) = (cˆ, hˆ), the inequality (B.6) turns into an equality, whence (B.5) holds with
equality. Sending n→∞, the monotone convergence theorem and (B.3) imply that
w(x,m) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−δtU
(
cˆtζ
NtX0,x,cˆ,hˆt
)
dt
]
≤ V (x,m).
This, together with part (i), shows that w(x,m) = V (x,m) and (cˆ, hˆ) is an optimal control.
Theorem B.1 can be extended to include the risky asset S in (4.1). Recall the setup in Section 4,
especially A′ in (4.4) and the value function V in (4.5). For any (c, h, pi) ∈ A′, we can also consider
the truncated version (c(n), h(n), pi(n)) ∈ A′ defined as in (B.1).
Theorem B.2. Let w ∈ C1,1(R+×R+) satisfy (4.7). For any (x,m) ∈ R2+ and (c, h, pi) ∈ A′, (B.2)
and (B.3) hold, with X0,x,c
(n),h(n) replaced by X0,x,c
(n),h(n),pi(n) and E[ · | Z1, ..., Zn] by E[ · | Fτn ].
(i) w(x,m) ≥ V (x,m) on R+ × R+.
(ii) Suppose there exist measurable functions c¯, h¯, p¯i : R2+ → R+, with c¯ and h¯ as described in
Theorem B.1 (ii) and p¯i(x,m) being the maximizer of
sup
pi∈R
{
piµxwx(x,m) +
1
2
σ2pi2x2wxx(x,m)
}
, ∀ (x,m) ∈ R2+.
Let X¯, M¯ , N¯ denote the solutions to
dXs = Xs[r + µp¯i(Xs,Ms)− (c¯(Xs,Ms) + h¯(Xs,Ms))]ds+ σXsp¯i(Xs,Ms)dWs, X0 = x;
dMs = Ms
[
β − g(h¯(ζNsXs,Ms))
]
ds, M0 = m;
Ns =
∞∑
k=0
k1{Tk≤t<Tk+1}, with T0 := 0, Tn+1 := inf
{
t ≥ Tn
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
Tn
Msds ≥ Zn+1
}
, n ≥ 1.
Consider the processes (cˆ, hˆ, pˆi), with cˆ and hˆ defined as in (B.4) and pˆit := p¯i(ζ
N¯tX¯t, M¯t) for
t ≥ 0. If (cˆ, hˆ, pˆi) ∈ A′, defined in (4.4), then (cˆ, hˆ, pˆi) is an optimal control of the problem
(4.5), and w(x,m) = V (x,m) on R+ × R+.
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Proof. (i) We follow the arguments in Theorem B.1, with X0,x,c,h replaced by X0,x,c,h,pi in (4.2).
For any (cˆ, hˆ, pˆi) ∈ A′, we now prove (B.5) for all n ∈ N. For n = 1, as w is a solution to (4.7),
Itoˆ’s formula yields (B.6), with the left hand side and the second line under the expectation E2.
By (B.2), letting t → ∞ gives (B.7), with the right hand side under the expectation E2. Fubini’s
theorem and (4.3) imply that (B.8)-(B.9), with their second lines again under the expectation E2.
Thus, (B.5) holds for n = 1. Now, suppose (B.5) holds for n = k > 1, i.e. (B.10) is true. As w is a
solution to (4.7) and in view of (B.2), by Itoˆ’s formula (B.11) holds, with E[ · | Z1, ..., Zn] replaced
by E[ · | Fτn ]. By Fubini’s theorem and (4.3) as above, (B.12) follows. This, together with (B.10),
implies that (B.5) holds for n = k + 1. Thus, (B.5) follows by induction. Letting n→∞ in (B.5)
and recalling (B.3), the same argument as at the end of the proof of Theorem B.1 (i) yields that
w(x,m) ≥ V (x,m).
(ii) This follows from the same argument as in the proof of Theorem B.1 (ii).
In the sequel we relax the conditions in Theorem B.1. To this end, for any (x,m) ∈ R2+ and
(c, h) ∈ A, suppose that the household is given additional wealth ε > 0 at time 0, and decides not
to spend it at all over time. Imagine that at time 0 the household deposits x ≥ 0 in a standard
account, and ε > 0 in a separate additional account. Then, the household behaves as if there was
no additional wealth: at each time t ≥ 0, the amount it spends in consumption (resp. healthcare)
is ct (resp. ht) multiplied by the standard account balance. The rates of spending in consumption
and healthcare therefore become
(cε)t =
ctX
0,x,c,h
t
X0,x,c,ht + εe
rt
, (hε)t =
htX
0,x,c,h
t
X0,x,c,ht + εe
rt
∀t ≥ 0. (B.13)
This new process hε of spending rate in healthcare, different from h, changes the moments of deaths.
More precisely, starting from time 0, the household takes
hε0(t) :=
h0(t)X
0,x,c0,h0
t
X0,x,c0,h0t + εe
rt
(B.14)
as instantaneous spending rates in healthcare. As in (2.8), the time of the first death is defined as
τ ε1 := inf
{
t ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
M
0,m,hε0
s ds ≥ Z1
}
≤ τ1.
Starting from time τ ε1 , the household takes
hε1(t) :=
h0(t)X
0,x,c0,h0
t
X0,x,c0,h0t + εe
rt
1{t<τ1} +
h1(t)X
0,x,c(1),h(1)
t
X0,x,c
(1),h(1)
t + εe
rt
1{t≥τ1}
as instantaneous spending rates in healthcare. Set mε1 := M
0,m,hε0
τε1
, the time of the second death is
defined as in (2.8) by
τ ε2 := inf
{
t ≥ τ ε1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t
τε1
M
τε1 ,m
ε
1,h
ε
1
s ds ≥ Z2
}
≤ τ2.
In general, for each n ∈ N, the household, starting from time τ εn, takes
hεn(t) :=
n−1∑
k=0
hk(t)X
0,x,c(k),h(k)
t
X0,x,c
(k),h(k)
t + εe
rt
1{τk≤t<τk+1} +
hn(t)X
0,x,c(n),h(n)
t
X0,x,c
(n),h(n)
t + εe
rt
1{t≥τn}
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as instantaneous spending rates in healthcare. Set mεn := M
τεn−1,m
ε
n−1,h
ε
n−1
τεn
, the (n + 1)th death
moment is defined as in (2.8) by
τ εn+1 := inf
{
t ≥ τ εn
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t
τεn
M τ
ε
n,m
ε
n,h
ε
n
s ds ≥ Zn+1
}
≤ τn+1.
As in (2.9), we can introduce the counting process
N εt := n for t ∈ [τ εn, τ εn+1). (B.15)
Similarly, define for each n ∈ N,
cεn(t) :=
n−1∑
k=0
ck(t)X
0,x,c(k),h(k)
t
X0,x,c
(k),h(k)
t + εe
rt
1{τk≤t<τk+1} +
cn(t)X
0,x,c(n),h(n)
t
X0,x,c
(n),h(n)
t + εe
rt
1{t≥τn}.
Observe that {cεn}, {hεn} ∈ L, and it can be checked that
(cε)(t) =
∞∑
k=0
cεn(t)1{τεk≤t<τεk+1}, (hε)(t) =
∞∑
k=0
hεn(t)1{τεk≤t<τεk+1}.
This in particular shows that (cε, hε) ∈ A. In view of (B.13), we have the identity
X0,x+ε,cε,hεt = X
0,x,c,h
t + εe
rt. (B.16)
Proposition B.1. Let w ∈ C1,1(R+×R+) satisfy (A.1). Suppose for any (x,m) ∈ R2+, (c, h) ∈ A,
and ε > 0,
lim
t→∞E
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
τεn
(δ +M0,m,h
(n)
ε
s )ds
)
w
(
ζnX0,x+ε,c
(n)
ε ,h
(n)
ε
t ,M
0,m,h
(n)
ε
t
) ∣∣∣∣∣ Z1, ..., Zn
]
= 0 ∀n ≥ 0,
(B.17)
lim
n→∞E
[
e−δτ
ε
nw
(
ζnX
0,x+ε,cε,hε
τεn
,M
0,m,hε
τεn
)]
= 0, (B.18)
lim
ε→0
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NεtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
. (B.19)
(i) w(x,m) ≥ V (x,m) on R+ × R+.
(ii) Suppose the measurable functions h¯ and c¯ specified in Theorem B.1 (ii) exist, so that we can
define (cˆ, hˆ) as in (B.4). If (cˆ, hˆ) ∈ A and satisfies (B.2) and (B.3), then (cˆ, hˆ) is an optimal
control to the problem (2.13), and w(x,m) = V (x,m) on R+ × R+.
Proof. We carry out the same arguments as in Theorem B.1. With the aid of (B.17), we obtain
(B.5), with (x, c, h, τn, Nt) replaced by (x+ ε, cε, hε, τ
ε
n, N
ε
t ). Letting n→∞ and using (B.18),
w(x+ ε,m) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtU
(
(cε)tζ
NεtX0,x+ε,cε,hεt
)
dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δtU
(
ctζ
NεtX0,x,c,ht
)
dt
]
,
where the equality follows from (B.16) and the definition of cε in (B.13). Sending ε→ 0, we obtain
from (B.19) that w(x,m) ≥ E[ ∫∞0 e−δtU(ctζNtX0,x,c,ht )dt]. Taking the supremum over (c, h) ∈ A
leads to w(x,m) ≥ V (x,m). The proof of (ii) is the same as Theorem B.1 (ii).
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Theorem B.2 can also be relaxed in a similar fashion.
Proposition B.2. Let w ∈ C1,1(R+ × R+) satisfy (4.7). For any (x,m) ∈ R2+, (c, h, pi) ∈ A′, and
ε > 0, suppose (B.17), (B.18), and (B.19) hold, with X0,x,c
(n)
ε ,h
(n)
ε replaced by X0,x,c
(n)
ε ,h
(n)
ε ,pi
(n)
ε and
E[ · | Z1, ..., Zn] by E[ · | Fτn ].
(i) w(x,m) ≥ V (x,m) on R+ × R+.
(ii) Suppose the measurable functions (c¯, h¯, p¯i) specified in Theorem B.2 (ii) exist, so that we
can define (cˆ, hˆ, pˆi) therein. If (cˆ, hˆ, pˆi) ∈ A′ and satisfies (B.2) and (B.3) as specified in
Theorem B.2, then (cˆ, hˆ, pˆi) is an optimal control to the problem (4.5), and w(x,m) = V (x,m)
on R+ × R+.
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